The Special Boat Squadron (abbreviated as SBS) (; ) is the Sri Lanka Navy's elite special forces unit, modeled after the British Special Boat Service. It was raised in 1993.
It forms part of the Sri Lanka Special Forces, alongside the Commando Regiment (CR), Army Special Forces Regiment (SF), and Air Force Special Forces (SLAFSF).
Role
The SBS was modeled after the Special Boat Service of the Royal Navy. In its role as a naval special forces unit it takes up a wide variety of operations such as amphibious raids, maritime counter-terrorism, reconnaissance and target indication, combat swimmer missions and small boat operations. As a Special Forces unit, its role is not limited to water-borne operations. The SBS conducts operations on land, together with the Commando Regiment (CR) and Special Forces Regiment (SF), with regular ground combat units of the Navy and the Army and on many occasions autonomously.
The roles of the Special Boat Squadron are predominantly focused on, but not restricted to, Small boat operations in support of littoral operations. Covert beach reconnaissance (hydrographic survey) in advance of amphibious assault. Covert assault route preparation in advance of amphibious assault. Recovery or protection of ships subject to terrorist action. Maritime counter-terrorism. Reconnaissance and target indication in the deep battlespace. Assault on verified targets. VBSS operation (Visit Board Search & Seizure). VIP protection.
History
Due to frequent resistance and various asymmetric tactics near the naval troop deployed areas in the country, the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) recognized the imminent need to raise a specially trained counter terrorist team and realized the value of special operations in the early stages of confronting separatist terrorism that exist in the country for over three decades. Although not formerly commissioned, the urge for action of a few young and unique officers and men who were more than willing to put themselves in harm's way at the enemy's doorstep, was evident in the early confrontation with the LTTE. Among them, Lieutenant Commander Shanthi Bahar had been a pioneer to lead a small team of specially trained sailors seeking LTTE hideouts in the jungles and thickets of Trincomalee. His untimely death in action delayed the foundation of a naval special force by many years.
The LTTE grew from a guerrilla group to a quasi-conventional force, and the Sea Tigers to a considerable strength. The LTTE and its war fighting mechanism solely depended on the Sea Tiger force for survival, first on the logistic train from the high seas, kept open in spite of a determined offensive of the Navy. Secondly, the Sea Tigers were an irritable distraction that taxed the Navy's resources to keep sea lines of communication with the Northern Peninsula. Thirdly, the Sea Tigers mastered asymmetric warfare with suicide boats, divers, mines and littoral attacks in coastal waters and lagoons