³⁵⁷ In answer to Mr. M. L. Reddi Garu, the following statement was laid on the table:—
Statement showing the average cost of silver purchased by the—³⁵⁹
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Year. Royal Mint India Office Financial Average Cost for Average Cost for Year. Standard Ounce. Standard Ounce. d. d. ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1893 36 5/16 No purchase 1893–94 1894 29¼ No purchase 1894–95 1895 30⅜ No purchase 1895–96 1896 30 5/16 No purchase 1896–97 1897 27⅞ No purchase 1897–98 1898 27¼ No purchase 1898–99 1899 27½ 28 1899–1900 1900 28¼ 29 1900–01 1901 27 15/16 No purchase 1901–02 1902 24 5/16 22·80 1902–03 1903 23 11/16 27·19 1903–04 1904 26½ 27·14 1904–05 1905 27 7/16 29·74 1905–06 1906 31 1/16 31·59 1906–07 1907 30 9/16 31·27 1907–08 1908 24 7/16 No purchase 1908–09 1909 23 11/16 No purchase 1909–10 1910 24⅞ No purchase 1910–11 1911 24 13/16 No purchase 1911–12 1912 27 15/16 28·71 1912–13 1913 28 1/16 28·71 1913–14 1914 24 15/16 No purchase 1914–15 1915 24¼ 33·96 1915–16 1916 30⅝ 33·96 1916–17 1917 39 15/16 42·78 1917–18 1918 47 15/16 48·20 1918–19 1919 49⅝ 52·04 1919–20 1920 50⅞ Silver purchased 1920–21 at special rates from the Baldwin mines and the Perth mint. ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
In the absence of information whether the price is F.O.B. or C.I.F. it is difficult to say that the Secretary of State has had to pay higher prices for silver than were paid by the Master of the Royal Mint.
³⁵⁸ From 1900–1 to 1920–21 the profits on coinage credited to the gold-standard reserve amounted to £28,573,606 only: while during the same period Interest and Discount gave £13,306,847 or nearly one-half the profits on coinage. Cf. _East India: Accounts and Estimates_, 1921–22, _Cmd_, 1517 of 1921, p. 20.
³⁵⁹ _Legislative Assembly Debates_, Vol. II, No. 3, September, 10 1921, p. 181.
The source of a danger in a reserve such as this was well pointed out by Jevons when he said:³⁶⁰
“… good government funds and good bills can always be sold at some price so that a banking firm with a strong reserve of this kind might always maintain their solvency. But the remedy might be worse for the community than the disease, and the forced sale of the reserve might create such a disturbance in the money market as would do more harm than the suspension of payment. …”