36. First of all, I beg you to observe, that this passage is merely _a flagrant act of theft_, committed upon JUDGE HALE; next, you perceive, that which I noticed in paragraph 28, a most base and impudent garbling of the Scriptures. Next, you see, that BLACKSTONE, like HALE, comes, at last, to the _poor-laws_; and tells us that to take other men's goods without leave, is theft, _because_ "charity is here reduced to a system, and interwoven in our very constitution." That is to say, to relieve the necessitous; to prevent their suffering from want; completely to render starvation impossible, makes a part of our very constitution. "THEREFORE, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being _unmerciful_ for denying this privilege to the necessitous." Pray mark the word _therefore_. You see, our laws, he says, are not to be taxed with being unmerciful in deeming the necessitous taker _a thief_. And _why_ are they not to be deemed unmerciful? BECAUSE the laws provide effectual relief for the necessitous. It follows, then, of course, even according to BLACKSTONE himself, that if the Constitution _had not_ provided this effectual relief for the necessitous, then the laws _would have been unmerciful_ in deeming the necessitous taker a thief.
37. But now let us hear what that GROTIUS and that PUFFENDORF say; let us hear what these great writers on the law of nature and of nations say upon this subject. BLACKSTONE has mentioned the names of them both; but he has not thought proper to notice their arguments, much less has he attempted to answer them. They are two of the most celebrated men that ever wrote; and their writings are referred to as high authority, with regard to all the subjects of which they have treated. The following is a passage from GROTIUS, on War and Peace, Book II., chap. 2.
38. "Let us see, further, what common right there appertains to men in those things which have already become the property of individuals. Some persons, perchance, may consider it strange to question this, as proprietorship seems to have absorbed all that right which arose out of a state of things in common. But it is not so. For, it is to be considered, _what was the intention of those who first introduced private property_, which we may suppose to have been such, as to deviate as little as possible from _natural equity_. For if even _written laws_ are to be construed in that sense, as far as it is practicable, much more so are _customs_, which are not fettered by the chains of writers.--Hence it follows, first, that, in case of _extreme necessity_, the _pristine right of using things revives_, as much as if they had remained in common; because, in all human laws, as well as in the law of private property, _this case of extreme necessity appears to have been excepted_.--So, if the means of sustenance, as in case of a sea-voyage, should chance to fail, that which any individual may have, should be shared in common. And thus, a fire having broken out, I am justified in destroying the house of my neighbour, in order to preserve my own house; and I may cut in two the ropes or cords amongst which any ship is driven, if it cannot be otherwise disentangled. All which exceptions are not made in the written law, but are presumed.--For the opinion has been acknowledged amongst Divines, that, if any one, in such case of necessity, take from another person what is requisite for the preservation of his life, _he does not commit a theft_. The meaning of which definition is not, as many contend, that the proprietor of the thing be bound to give to the needy upon the principle of _charity_; but, that all things distinctly vested in proprietors ought to be regarded as such _with a certain benign acknowledgment of the primitive right_. For if the original distributors of things were questioned, as to what they thought about this matter, they would reply what I have said. _Necessity_, says Father SENECA, _the great excuse for human weakness, breaks every law_; that is to say, _human law_, or law made after the manner of man."