Chapter II.—.

“ first who sought to establish by rational

considerations the whole complex of orthodox doctrines.” So

Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, p. 326) of Gregory of Nyssa. This

marks the transition from ante-Nicene times. Then, at all events in the

hands of Origen, philosophy was identical with theology. Now, that

there is a ‘complex of orthodox doctrines’ to defend, philosophy becomes the handmaid of theology. Gregory, in this respect, has done the most important service of any of the writers of the Church in the fourth century. He treats each single philosophical view only as a help to grasp the formulæ of faith; and the truth of that view consists with him only in its adaptability to that end. Notwithstanding strong speculative leanings he does not defend orthodoxy either in the fashion of the Alexandrian school or in the fashion of some in modern times, who put forth a system of philosophy to which the dogmas of the Faith are to be accommodated.

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume V/Prolegomena/His General Character as a Theologian

If this be true, the question as

to his attitude towards Plato, which is one of the first that suggests

itself, is settled. Against polytheism he does indeed seek to defend

Christianity by connecting it apologetically with Plato’s system. This we cannot be surprised at, considering that the definitions of the doctrines of the Catholic Church were formed in the very place where the last considerable effort of Platonism was made; but he by no means makes the New Life in any way dependent on this system of philosophy. “We cannot speculate,” he says (De Anim. et Resurrect.),…“we must leave the Platonic car.” But still when he is convinced that Plato will confirm doctrine he will, even in polemic treatises, adopt his view; for instance, he seeks to grasp the truth of the Trinity from the Platonic account of our internal consciousness, i.e. ψυχὴ, λόγος, νοῦς; because such a proof from consciousness is, to Gregory, the surest and most reliable.

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume V/Prolegomena/His General Character as a Theologian

The “rational

considerations,” then, by which Gregory would have established

Christian doctrine are not necessarily drawn from the philosophy of the

time: nor, further, does he seek to rationalize entirely all religious

truth. In fact he resigns the hope of comprehending the Incarnation and

all the great articles. This is the very thing that distinguishes the

Catholic from the Eunomian. “Receiving the fact we leave untampered with the manner of the creation of the Universe, as altogether secret and inexplicable.” With a turn resembling the view of Tertullian, he comes back to the conclusion that for us after all Religious Truth consists in mystery. “The Church possesses the means of demonstrating these things: or rather, she has faith, which is surer than demonstration.” He developes the truth of the Resurrection as much by the fulfilment of God’s promises as by metaphysics: and it has been considered as one of the proofs that the treatise What is being ‘in the image of God’? is not his that this subordination of philosophical proof to the witness of the Holy Spirit is not preserved in it.

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume V/Prolegomena/His General Character as a Theologian

Nevertheless there was a large

field, larger even than in the next century, in which rationalizing was

not only allowable, but was even required of him. In this there are

three questions which Gregory has treated with particular fulness and

originality. They are:—1. Evil; 2. The relation between the ideal

and the actual Man; 3. Spirit.

I. He takes, to begin with, Origen’s view of evil. Virtue and Vice are not opposed to each other as two Existencies: but as Being is opposed to not-Being. Vice exists only as an absence. But how did this arise?

In answering this question he

seems sometimes to come very near Manicheism, and his writings must be

read very carefully, in order to avoid fixing upon him the groundless

charge that he leaves evil in too near connexion with Matter. But the

passages which give rise to this charge consist of

comparisons found in his homilies and meditations; just as a modern

theologian might in such works make the Devil the same as Sin and

Death. The only imperfection in his view is that he is unable to regard evil as not only suffered but even permitted by God. But this imperfection is inseparable from his time: for Manicheism was too near and its opposition too little overcome for such a view to be possible for him; he could not see that it is the only one able thoroughly to resist Dualism.