This case raises the simple question whether thirty-three years after a judgment naturalizing an alien is alleged to have been rendered but not recorded, or, if recorded, the record lost, a common-law court has jurisdiction to enter such judgment of naturalization nunc pro tunc, when no entry or memorandum appeared upon the record or files at the time the original judgment is supposed to have been rendered. If there be no jurisdiction to enter such judgment, it may be attacked collaterally.
The power to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or to supply defects or omissions in the record, even after the lapse of the term, is inherent in courts of justice, and was recognized by this court in Re Wight, 134 U.S. 136, 33 L. ed. 865, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U.S. 612, 623, 41 L. ed. 572, 576, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, and United States v. Vigil, 10 Wall. 423, 19 L. ed. 954. It is also conferred upon courts of the United States by Rev. Stat. §§ 899, 900, and 901 (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 675). This power, however, must be distinguished from that discussed by the court in Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 26 L. ed. 797, wherein we held that the authority of the court to set aside or modify an existing judgment or order ceased with the expiration of the term, and from that time all final judgments and decrees passed beyond its control, and that if such errors existed they could only be corrected by writ of error or appeal to a superior tribunal. An exception was there made of certain mistakes of fact not put in issue or passed upon, such as that a party died before judgment, or was a married woman, or was an infant and no guardian appeared or was appointed, or that there was error in the process through the default of the clerk. In the Federal courts the power to amend is given in general language in the final clause of Rev. Stat. § 954 (U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 696), which declares that such courts 'may at any time permit either of the parties to amend any defect in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions as it shall, in its discretion and by its rules, prescribe.' As above indicated, however, this power has been restricted to amendments made during the progress of the case, or, at least, during the continuance of the term in which the judgment is rendered.
This power to amend, too, must not be confounded with the power to create. It presupposes an existing record, which is defective by reason of some clerical error or mistake, or the omission of some entry which should have been made during the progress of the case, or by the loss of some document originally filed therein. The difference between creating and amending a record is analogous to that between the construction and repair of a piece of personal property. If a house or vessel, for instance, be burned or otherwise lost, it can only be rebuilt, and the word 'repair' is wholly inapplicable to its subsequent reconstruction. The word 'repair,' as the word 'amend,' contemplates an existing structure which has become imperfect by reason of the action of the elements, or otherwise. In the cases of vessels particularly, this distinction is one which cannot be ignored, as it lies at the basis of an important diversity of jurisdiction between the common-law and maritime courts.
The power to recreate a record, no evidence of which exists, has been the subject of much discussion in the courts, and the weight of authority is decidedly against the existence of such power. We have examined a large number of authorities upon this point, and while they do not altogether harmonize in their conclusions, the practice in some states being much more rigid than in others, we have found none which supports the contention that a record may be created to take the place of one of which no written memorandum was made or entered at the time the original judgment was supposed to have been rendered. The following cases contain instructive discussions of the principles involved, but an epitome of them would subserve no useful purpose: Bilansky v. Minnesota, 3 Minn. 427, Gil. 313; Schoonover v. Reed, 65 Ind. 313; Smith v. Hood, 25 Pa. 218, 64 Am. Dec. 692; State ex rel. Graves v. Primm, 61 Mo. 166; Brown v. Coward, 3 Hill, 4; Lynch v. Reynolds, 69 Bush, 547; Coughran v. Gutcheus, 18 Ill. 390; Frink v. Frink, 43 N. H. 508, 80 Am. Dec. 189; Rugg v. Parker, 7 Gray, 172; Balch v. Shaw, 7 Cush. 282.