Soon after the appointment of the two judges above named the legal tender question was again brought before the court, a full bench of nine judges sitting and participating in the decision of the question. Five of the nine concurred in holding the legal tender act constitutional, Justice Strong delivering the opinion of the court. It is a noticeable feature of the case that a judge who had just taken his seat should be selected to pronounce the decision; that after a uniform course of decisions, made and upheld by all the great jurists of the country for eighty-five years, two judges who had just been appointed should be found delivering opinions reversing this long settled rule, and that both of said judges were appointed because of their avowed friendship for the corporations which were to be so largely benefited by the reversal of this long settled construction of the constitution upon the question of legal tenders, and it seems that even these judges base their decision upon what they deem the necessity for a reversal rather than upon any constitutional grounds. Justice Strong, as preliminary to the opinion of the court, says: "The controlling questions in these cases are the following: Are the acts of congress, known as the legal tender acts, constitutional when applied to contracts made before their passage? and, secondly, Are they valid as applicable to debts contracted since their enactment? These questions have been elaborately argued, and they have received from the court that consideration which their great importance demands. It would be difficult to overestimate the consequences which must follow our decisions. They will affect the entire business of the country, and take hold of the possible continued existence of the government. If it be held by this court that congress has no constitutional power, under any circumstances, or in any emergency, to make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts (a power confessedly professed by every independent sovereignty other than the United States), the government is without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies, become indispensable, even if they were not when the act of congress now called in question was enacted. It is also clear that if we hold the acts invalid as applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have occurred since their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout the country, great business derangements, wide-spread distress, and the rankest injustice. The debts which have been contracted since February 25th, 1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the existing indebtedness of the country. They have been contracted in view of the acts of congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender, and in reliance upon that declaration. Men have bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and assumed every variety of obligation, contemplating that payment might be made with such notes. Indeed, legal tender notes have become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision, it be established that their debts and obligations can be discharged only in gold coin; if, contrary to the expectations of all parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of the grossest injustice, and debtors are loaded with an obligation it was never intended they should assume. A large percentage is added to every debt, and such must become the demand for gold to satisfy contracts, that ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and bankruptcy, may be expected. These consequences are too obvious to admit of question. And there is no well-founded distinction to be made between the constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for debts contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge of all debts, as well those incurred before as those made after its enactment. There may be a difference in the effects produced by the acts and in the hardship of their operation; but in both cases the fundamental question, that which tests the validity of the legislation, is, Can congress constitutionally give to treasury notes the character and qualities of money? Can such notes be constituted a legitimate circulating medium having a defined legal value? If they can, then such notes must be available to fulfil all contracts (not expressed by exception) in money, without reference to the time when the contract was made."