[369] _Ibid._ (1874), 150; _ibid._ (1893), 242.

[370] _Laws_ (1887), 528-40; _ibid._ (1889), 1046-64; _ibid._ (1895), 300-308.

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[372] _Const. of the State of Del._ (1897), Art. II, sec. 18, p. 141.

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 79

_b_) _Judicial divorce: jurisdiction, kinds, and causes._--Regarding the causes of divorce the history of the middle and western states reveals little that is peculiar as compared with that of the southern or eastern group. On the whole, a medial course has been pursued. There is nothing very radical or very conservative. The statutes of these commonwealths are entitled to be looked upon as constituting the average American type.

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 79

The policy of New York has, indeed, seemed to be exceptional. Throughout the century absolute divorce has been allowed only on the scriptural ground. In 1787--for the first time since New Netherland came under English rule--a general divorce law was enacted. The preamble hints at the recent practice of special legislation. "Whereas," we are told, "the Laws at present in being within this state, respecting Adultery, are very defective, and Applications have, in Consequence, been made to the Legislature, praying their Interposition;" and since "it is thought more advisable ... to make some general Provision in such Cases, than to afford relief to Individuals, upon their partial representations, without a just and Constitutional Trial of the Facts;" therefore for the offense named, when the persons are inhabitants of the state, a "Petition or Bill" may be presented to the chancellor. The latter is empowered to direct the trial of the case by a "special or common jury" before either the supreme or any circuit court; and in case of conviction may "pronounce the marriage between the said parties to be dissolved, and both of them freed" from its obligations. The guilty defendant is forbidden to "remarry any person whatsoever;" while the innocent plaintiff is fully authorized to "make and complete another marriage, in like manner as if the party convicted was actually dead." The divorce is not to affect the legitimacy of the children, and the chancellor is required to make proper orders for their care and maintenance and for the wife's alimony.[373]

[373] Act of March 30, 1787: _Laws of the State of N. Y._ (1789), II, 133, 134; and _ibid._ (1792), I, 428, 429.