CHAPTER VI. THE METHOD OF FICHTE, AS SUGGESTED BY THE PRINCIPLES ALREADY LAID DOWN.
HE propositions which we have now studied, form the basis of the system of Fichte. Their relation to one another suggests his method. To understand this method fully, we must for a moment go behind these, and consider some facts in regard to propositions in general.
When we look closely at the nature of propositions, we find that every proposition of resemblance implies a difference; and every proposition of difference, a resemblance. If we say that X is Y, we imply that in some points it is not Y. If we say that X is like Y, we imply that in some respects it is different. So far as the first of these propositions is concerned, if the statement, X is Y, were absolutely true, it would not be made. We should not have X and Y at all. We should have either X or Y. Subject and predicate would be absolutely fused together, and the proposition would cease to exist. This is still more evident in regard to the other proposition, X is like Y. This implies that X is not Y, otherwise the two would not be compared. There must, then, be points of difference by which alone the resemblance can be made possible. On the other hand, it is equally true that all statements of difference imply a resemblance. No one would be so foolish as to deny what no one could have the slightest temptation to affirm. If I say, then, that X is not Y, I imply that there are certain elements in X, by which, if they were taken alone, it might be confounded with Y. Of course the elements of resemblance may be comparatively few, but something, in this case, must have occurred to bring them into prominence. If one says, for instance, that a tree is not a house, it must be because a comparison has been in some way suggested. Perhaps it had been proposed to pass the night in the tree, or under it. This fact, that all resemblance implies a difference, and all difference a resemblance may be illustrated by almost any book of riddles. The same sort of conundrum is sometimes proposed positively, and sometimes negatively. It is largely a matter of accident whether it be in the form, Why is X like Y. or, How does X differ from Y?
Every analysis, then, presupposes a synthesis, and every synthesis presupposes an analysis. When we say that X is Y, we express an analysis, or imply that such an analysis has been made. We recognize the fact that X and Y have already been distinguished from each other. If we say X is not Y, we imply a previous synthesis by which they had been brought together. The process of thought consists largely in the alternate formation of analyses and syntheses. Each at once presupposes and demands its opposite.
This may be very well illustrated by the ordinary processes of logic. In this way the proposition demands the syllogism; and one syllogism leads to another. We say, for instance, A is Z. The statement involves a contradiction; A is evidently not Z. Indeed, the recognition of this difference forms our starting point. We need to justify our affirmation by a synthesis. We find some element, Y, which is common to both. This furnishes the needed synthesis. A is Y, and Y is Z; thus, A is Z. But another analysis is forced upon us. A and Y are not absolutely one. They involve points of difference. A new synthesis is forced upon us. We find the element, X, which is common to both. The process goes on till we reach the last synthesis possible. We had found C to be a basis for a synthesis between A and D. A and C we unite by means of B, At last we face the proposition, A is B. A further synthesis is demanded, but we cannot make it. We have no means left. We must leave the matter to rest upon absolute affirmation, or upon some intuitive perception.
I have thus indicated the method that Fichte follows in this first statement of his philosophy. In each proposition, analysis finds elements of contradiction. These are united by a synthesis. They are, however, only partially united. Extremes still remain that are not brought together. The process continues as far as it can be carried. A fundamental contradiction at last remains unsolved. Appeal is finally made to the practical reason, that cuts the knot which the theoretical reason could not untie.