'So,' quod she, 'as it semeth that blisfulnesse conteneth many thinges, it were for to witen whether that alle thise thinges maken or conioignen as a maner body of blisfulnesse, by dyversitee of 120 parties or of membres; or elles, yif that any of alle thilke thinges be swich that it acomplisshe by him-self the substaunce of blisfulnesse, so that alle thise othre thinges ben referred and brought to blisfulnesse,' _that is to seyn, as to the cheef of hem_.
'I wolde,' quod I, 'that thou makedest me cleerly to understonde 125 what thou seyst, and that thou recordedest me the forseyde thinges.'
'Have I nat iuged,' quod she, 'that blisfulnesse is good?'
'Yis, forsothe,' quod I; 'and that soverein good.'
'Adde thanne,' quod she, 'thilke good, _that is maked blisfulnesse_, 130 to alle the forseide thinges; for thilke same blisfulnesse that is demed to ben soverein suffisaunce, thilke selve is soverein power, soverein reverence, soverein cleernesse _or noblesse_, and soverein delyt. CONCLUSIO. What seyst thou thanne of alle thise thinges, that is to seyn, suffisaunce, power, and this othre thinges; 135 ben they thanne as membres of blisfulnesse, or ben they referred and brought to soverein good, right as alle thinges that ben brought to the chief of hem?'
'I understonde wel;' quod I, 'what thou purposest to seke; but I desire for to herkne that thou shewe it me.' 140
'Tak now thus the discrecioun of this questioun,' quod she. 'Yif alle thise thinges,' quod she, 'weren membres to felicitee, than weren they dyverse that oon from that other; and swich is the nature of parties or of membres, that dyverse membres compounen a body.' 145
'Certes,' quod I, 'it hath wel ben shewed heer-biforn, that alle thise thinges ben alle o thing.'
'Thanne ben they none membres,' quod she; 'for elles it sholde seme that blisfulnesse were conioigned al of on membre allone; but that is a thing that may nat be don.' 150
'This thing,' quod I, 'nis nat doutous; but I abyde to herknen the remnaunt of thy questioun.'
'This is open and cleer,' quod she, 'that alle othre thinges ben referred and brought to good. For therefore is suffisaunce requered, for it is demed to ben good; and forthy is power requered, 155 for men trowen also that it be good; and this same thing mowen we thinken and coniecten of reverence, and of noblesse, and of delyt. Thanne is soverein good the somme and the cause of al that aughte ben desired; for-why thilke thing that with-holdeth no good in it-self, ne semblaunce of good, it ne may nat wel in 160 no manere be desired ne requered. And the contrarie: for thogh that thinges by hir nature ne ben nat goode, algates, yif men wene that ben goode, yit ben they desired as though that they weren verrayliche goode. And therfor is it that men oughten to wene by right, that bountee be the soverein fyn, and the cause 165 of alle the thinges that ben to requeren. But certes, thilke that is cause for which men requeren any thing, it semeth that thilke same thing be most desired. As thus: yif that a wight wolde ryden for cause of hele, he ne desireth nat so mochel the moevinge to ryden, as the effect of his hele. Now thanne, sin that 170 alle thinges ben requered for the grace of good, they ne ben nat desired of alle folk more thanne the same good. But we han graunted that blisfulnesse is that thing, for whiche that alle thise othre thinges ben desired; thanne is it thus: that, certes, only blisfulnesse is requered and desired. By whiche thing it sheweth 175 cleerly, that of good and of blisfulnesse is al oon and the same substaunce.'