[388] Act of Apr. 1: _Pub. Laws_ (1887), 132; also in _Gen. Stat._ (1896), II, 1273. This provision thus seems to be in force; if so, since the act of 1890 already cited, the term must be two years.

[389] Act of March 4: _Pub. Laws_ (1891), 76. In general, for the present law regulating both kinds of divorce in New Jersey, see _Gen. Stat._ (1896), II, 1267-75.

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 84

The framers of the Pennsylvania statute of 1785 saw fit to indulge in an apologetic preamble. "Whereas," we are assured, "it is the design of marriage, and the wish of the parties entering into that state, that it should continue during their joint lives, yet where the one party is under natural or legal incapacities of faithfully discharging the matrimonial vow, or is guilty of acts and deeds inconsistent with the nature thereof, the laws of every well-regulated society ought to give relief to the innocent and injured person;" therefore it is enacted that the justices of the supreme court may grant divorce, "not only from bed and board, but also from matrimony,"(1) when either person at the time of the contract was and still is physically incompetent; (2) has knowingly entered into a bigamous marriage; (3) has committed adultery; or (4) has been guilty of "wilful and malicious desertion, without a reasonable cause," for the space of four years. The court is empowered to grant a divorce from bed and board, but not from the bond of wedlock, "if any husband shall, maliciously, either (1) abandon his family, or (2) turn his wife out of doors, or (3) by cruel and barbarous treatment endanger her life, or (4) offer such indignities to her person, as to render her condition intolerable, or life burdensome, and thereby force her to withdraw from his house and family." In these cases the wife is allowed "such alimony as her husband's circumstances will admit of so as the same do not exceed the third part of the annual profits or income of his estate, or of his occupation or labour," or the court may decree "but one of them" as justice may require. She shall continue to enjoy this alimony "until a reconciliation shall take place, or until the husband shall by his petition or libel, offer to receive or cohabit with her again, and to use her as a good husband ought to do." Then the court is authorized either to suspend the decree; or, if the wife refuse "to return and cohabit under the protection of the court," it may discharge and annul the same. But if he fail to make good his offers and engagement, the "former sentence and decree may be revived and enforced;" and the arrears of alimony may be ordered paid.[390]

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 84