This is an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. It was decided in that court upon a demurrer to the bill of complaint; the demurrer being sustained, and the bill dismissed. The bill was brought by the present appellants, as assignees in bankruptcy of William A. Saunders, against said William A. Saunders and Mary P. Saunders, his wife; and, after alleging that, by due course of proceeding, William A. Saunders had been adjudged a bankrupt, and the plaintiffs appointed assignees of his estate, it proceeds to say that they have discovered, within one year, 'and been first informed of, facts and circumstances upon which they believe, and therefore aver, that the said bankrupt, without consideration, transferred to and placed in the hands of his wife, the said Mary P. Saunders, a large amount of personal property in the form of money, bonds, stocks and other securities, none of which can your orators more particularly describe, because all particular information is refused by the bankrupt and his wife, and the persons managing the property for them, and because the same has been invested for income, and often changed in form by reinvestment, and in pursuance of devices for more effectual concealment.' Then it is further averred that 'said property is of the value of about forty thousand dollars, and was so transferred by said bankrupt to his said wife for the purpose of concealing the same from his creditors and from these assignees, and to delay, hinder, and defraud his creditors, he being then deeply indebted, and to an amount wholly beyond his means and ability to liquidate and pay, so that he was hopelessly insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy.' The prayer of the bill is 'that said Mary P. Saunders, the respondent, may fully, truly, and particularly answer this bill, but not under oath, which is hereby waived,' and for a decree that said property may be held to belong to the assets of said William A. Saunders in bankruptcy, and the respondent compelled to transfer and deliver the property, or the proceeds thereof, in whatever form existing, to the plaintiffs, as assets of the bankrupt, and for further and other relief.

The imperfections of this bill are very obvious. Counsel for appellants, conceding the doctrine of Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95 U.S. 3, and Trust Co. v. Sedgwick, 97 U.S. 304, that at wife cannot be held liable to a personal judgment for money received of her husband during the marital relation, argues that this bill is an attempt to proceed against a fund in her hands; but as no particular fund is named, as no particular set of securities or description of them is given in the bill, as no place is named where they are deposited, nor any person, even the wife, as holding them, as no real estate is mentioned as belonging to this fund, as the nature and character of the conversion made of the fund after it came to the hands of the wife is not set forth, it seems impossible to maintain such a bill as seeking to lay hold of and appropriate a particular fund coming from the bankrupt himself, or even the proceeds of such a fund. As was very pertinently asked by the circuit judge in his opinion sustaining the demurrer, what relief could be given by the court, or what decree could be granted on this bill, if it were taken pro confesso; no opposition being made to it? 14 Fed. Rep. 907. It is not possible to see what decree could be made, or what relief could be given. It is not a bill of discovery, because the answer under oath of the defendant is expressly waived. No interrogatories are propounded to either of the defendants; no effort made to obtain from them, or either of them, by way of sworn answer, anything which could be used as evidence in the case. An issue of a general denial of the truth of the bill would leave nothing on which evidence could be introduced. It is, in fact, what is familiarly known as a 'fishing bill.' The plaintiffs allege no distinct fact which the defendants, or either of them, can be called upon to deny. The plaintiffs do not say positively that any of the allegations of the bill are true, but the substance of what they say is that they have received certain information which excites their suspicion; and this information is so vague, so uncertain and indefinite as it regards any fund or any particular sum of money or bonds, or any time or occasion when they were placed in the control of the female defendant, that, unless we are prepared to establish the proposition that, whenever a married woman is suspected of having received money from her husband to the prejudice of his creditors, she must be brought up to answer, and not under oath, as to what she has done with it, this bill must be held to be insufficient.

Huntington v. Saunders (120 U.S. 78)/Opinion of the Court