"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thâpanâ_). Opponent. Yes.
Adherent. Is _C D_? (_pâpanâ_). Opponent. No.
Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_. That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false. Hence your first answer is refuted.")
The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thâpanâ, because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.
The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed pâpanâ because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion
is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:
"If _D_ be derived of _C_. Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_. But you affirmed _B_ of _A_. (therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is wrong."
This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get
"If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_. But _A_ is _B_. Therefore _C_ is _D_.
By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished [Footnote ref 1]."
Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyâpti_), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (_arthakriyâkâritva_). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyâpti may be given thus: "Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to