[418] _Rev. Stat._ (1838), 242-44. The sixth ground, as enumerated in the text, the first of this act, is "any crime" committed in the United States or the territories, the punishment for which is deemed "infamous."

[420] Act of June 1: _Gen. Laws_ (1849), 62, 63.

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 92

A pause of three years next ensues before the lawmaker resumes his tinkering with the causes of divorce. The act of 1852 admits the seven general grounds, as these had existed since the change in 1849; but with two important modifications. For now "habitual drunkenness," without reference to the term during which it has existed, and cruel treatment, each on the part of either husband or wife, are constituted reasons for dissolving the marriage bond. By the same law a divorce for adultery is denied when there has been (1) connivance; (2) voluntary cohabitation after knowledge of the offense; (3) neglect to petition within two years; or (4) when the petitioner is guilty of the same crime.[421] Seven years later the time of abandonment, to constitute a cause, was reduced to one year, the court being thus deprived of its discretionary power to grant a divorce for desertion during a shorter period.[422]

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 92

Finally the long series of enactments defining the grounds of absolute divorces came to a halt in 1873, when the law of Indiana in this regard took its present form. The superior and circuit courts, on petition of either spouse, are granted jurisdiction. Three very important and beneficial amendments, producing a marked decrease in the number of divorces annually granted, are now made. The term of abandonment is increased from one year to two years; "failure of the husband to make reasonable provision for his family" is changed to such failure for a "period of two years;" and, most significant of all, the omnibus clause, existing since 1824 and rephrased in 1838, providing that divorces may be granted "for any other cause" which the court shall deem "reasonable and proper," is stricken out.[423] As a result, the marriage tie may now be dissolved for (1) adultery; (2) impotence existing at the time of the marriage; (3) abandonment for two years; (4) cruel and inhuman treatment; (5) habitual drunkenness; (6) failure of the husband to make reasonable provision for his family for two years; (7) the conviction of either person, in any country, subsequent to the marriage, of an infamous crime. Until very recently limited divorce was not recognized in Indiana; but a married woman might bring action for the support of herself and infant children in the following cases, being analogous to those sanctioned by the Ohio law: (1) when the husband shall have deserted his wife, or wife and children, without leaving sufficient provision for support; (2) when he shall have been convicted of felony and imprisoned in the state prison, not leaving his wife, or wife and children, the same provision; (3) when he is a habitual drunkard and by reason thereof becomes incapacitated or neglects to provide for his family; or (4) when he renounces the marriage covenant, or refuses to live with his wife in the conjugal relation, by joining himself to a sect or denomination the rules and doctrines of which require such renunciation or forbid a man and woman to dwell and cohabit together in the conjugal relation according to the true intent and meaning of the institution of marriage.[424] A statute of 1903 authorizes separation from bed and board "for a limited time" in case of (1) adultery; (2) "desertion, or where the wife is plaintiff, neglect or refusal to suitably provide for her, covering a period of six months;" (3) habitual cruelty of one party, "or such constant strifes of both parties as render their living together intolerable;" (4) habitual drunkenness, "or the confirmed and excessive use of morphine, cocaine, or any other drug;" (5) gross and wanton neglect of conjugal duty for six months.[425]

A History of Matrimonial Institutions, Volume 3 (of 3) — Part 92