In Logic we ordinarily use the expressions demonstrable or indemonstrable only in respect of _propositions_, but these might be better designated by the titles respectively of _mediately and immediately certain_ propositions; for pure Philosophy has also propositions of both kinds, _i.e._ true propositions, some of which are susceptible of proof and others not. It can, as philosophy, prove them on _a priori_ grounds, but it cannot demonstrate them; unless we wish to depart entirely from the proper meaning of this word, according to which _to demonstrate_ (_ostendere_, _exhibere_) is equivalent to presenting a concept in intuition (whether in proof or merely in definition). If the intuition is _a priori_ this is called construction; but if it is empirical, then the Object is displayed by means of which objective reality is assured to the concept. Thus we say of an anatomist that he demonstrates the human eye, if by a dissection of this organ he makes intuitively evident the concept which he has previously treated discursively.

It hence follows that the rational concept of the supersensible substrate of all phenomena in general, or even of that which must be placed at the basis of our arbitrary will in respect of the moral law, viz. of transcendental freedom, is already, in kind, an indemonstrable concept and a rational Idea; while virtue is so, in degree. For there can be given in experience, as regards its quality, absolutely nothing corresponding to the former; whereas in the latter case no empirical product attains to the degree of that causality, which the rational Idea prescribes as the rule.

Kant's Critique of Judgement — Part 151

As in a rational Idea the _Imagination_ with its intuitions does not attain to the given concept, so in an aesthetical Idea the _Understanding_ by its concepts never attains completely to that internal intuition which the Imagination binds up with a given representation. Since, now, to reduce a representation of the Imagination to concepts is the same thing as to _expound_ it, the aesthetical Idea may be called an _inexponible_ representation of the Imagination (in its free play). I shall have occasion in the sequel to say something more of Ideas of this kind; now I only note that both kinds of Ideas, rational and aesthetical, must have their principles; and must have them in Reason--the one in the objective, the other in the subjective principles of its employment.

Kant's Critique of Judgement — Part 151