Constructive ambiguity is a term generally credited to Henry Kissinger, said to be the foremost exponent of the negotiating tactic it designates. It refers to the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose. Constructive ambiguity is often disparaged as fudging. It might be employed in a negotiation, both to disguise an inability to resolve a contentious issue on which the parties remain far apart and to do so in a manner that enables each to claim obtaining some concession on it.
It warrants further hopes that the ensuing postponement of resolution on this particular point, in a way that causes neither side excessive discomfort, will enable them to make real progress on other matters. If this progress takes place, the unresolved question might be revisited at a later date, if not voided altogether by the passage of time. On the other hand, since ambiguity in agreements can generate subsequent controversy, the likelihood of its employment proving constructive in comparison to further attempts to negotiate the point in question in clear terms is a question best left for historians.
Examples of constructive ambiguities in diplomacy
UN Security Council's Resolution 242
The UN Security Council agreed on the text of its Resolution 242, after the crushing defeat that Israel inflicted on joint Arab forces during the Six-Day War in 1967. As a result of bargaining between the powers sitting in the Security Council, the resolution reflected the deeply polarized political opinion. The provision of the resolution which prompted different and incompatible interpretations was the one immediately following the preamble of the text, reading: "establishment of just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for…territorial integrity…of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries."
The use of an unnatural English construction "territories occupied in recent conflict" without the expected definite article, "the", made it possible to question whether Israel was asked to withdraw from all the territories occupied in the recent conflict, or to withdraw from some, but not all, such territories. Notably, the French translation of the document, unlike the English original, used the definite article, demanding the "retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit". Thus the French version, which together with the English version was an official UN version of the document, suggested that Israel must withdraw from all territories that it occupied during the Six-Day War.
Naturally, the French interpretation suited the interests of Arab countries, which made numerous attempts to prove its validity. By contrast, Israel opposed such an interpretation, and the sponsor of the resolution, Lord Caradon, appears to have had no intention of inserting the definite article into its text. Caradon additionally emphasized the additional and clarifying light that the second part of the first provision shed on its first part, and insisted that it must be given uppermost consideration. According to him, the boundary that existed before the Six-Day War did not satisfy the right of Israel to live within secure and recognised boundaries. Consequently, under this interpretation, Israel did not have to withdraw to its pre–Six-Day War borders.
The Shanghai Communiqué
The Shanghai Communiqué was issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on 27 February 1972, during the US President Richard Nixon's visit to China. Henry Kissinger acted as the principal US negotiator in this matter. The document contained an ambiguous provision inserted by the United States: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China." This provision lent itself to interpretation as the very first expression of American support for the one-China policy, calling for a reintegration of Taiwan into the PRC. But that is not what it meant in its original context.