The centre of interest lay in the Commons, and Sir Edward Grey's speech practically served for both Houses. All questions to Ministers were postponed, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced, without notice, a Postponement of Payments Bill, supplementing the Moratorium proclamation (p. 169) by empowering the Government to declare a general moratorium on occasion. By agreement, it was passed through all its stages at once; indeed, but for a protest from Mr. McCallum Scott (L., _Glasgow, Bridgeton_) it would not even have been read. The Bank holiday was prolonged for three days; but the stoppage was not to involve a general suspension of work and wages.
Then Sir Edward Grey spoke. He said that Ministers, then as always, had worked for peace, but in vain. As to British obligations he had told the Russian Foreign Minister in 1908 that he could promise no more than diplomatic support, and in the existing crisis, till the day before, he had promised nothing more. During the general election of 1906, at the crisis which led to the Algeciras Conference, he had been asked if, should a Franco-German war break out, Great Britain would give armed support; he had replied that he could promise nothing which would not be fully supported by public opinion, but, if war were forced on France through the Anglo-French _entente_ regarding Morocco, British public opinion would rally to her support. The French Government had then suggested conversations on this support between military and naval experts; and he had agreed, after consulting Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Haldane, and Mr. Asquith--since he could not, owing to the general election, consult the Cabinet--on the understanding that such conversations should in no way bind the Government. In the Agadir crisis he took the same line, and on November 22, 1912, he exchanged letters with the French Ambassador to this effect, but agreeing that if either Great Britain or France had grave reason to expect an attack by a third Power or a menace to the general peace, both Governments should consult whether they should co-operate and what measures they should take in common. But the British Government remained perfectly free to decide whether it should intervene. In the Morocco question, however, it was pledged to diplomatic support; in the existing crisis France was involved because of its obligation of honour to Russia, which did not apply to Great Britain, a Power which did not even know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance. But in view of the Anglo-French friendship, let every man look into his own heart and construe the extent of the British obligation for himself. In view of that friendship, the French Fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, and if, in a war which France had not sought, her unprotected coasts were bombarded, he felt that Great Britain could not stand aside. And, from the point of view of British interests, suppose the French Fleet withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Italy involved in the war, Great Britain, if she now stood aside, might be exposed to appalling risks. He had, therefore, on the previous afternoon given the French Ambassador an authorised assurance that, if a hostile German Fleet came into the Channel or North Sea the British Government would give France all the assistance in its power. He had just heard that the German Government would be prepared, were Great Britain pledged to neutrality, to agree that the German Fleet should not attack the northern coast of France (p. 170); but that was far too narrow an engagement. There was also the question, hourly becoming more serious, of the neutrality of Belgium. In 1870 Prince Bismarck had acknowledged the sanctity of the Treaty of 1839, and the Government could not take a narrower view of its obligations than Mr. Gladstone's Government took in 1870. He had asked in the previous week the French and German Governments whether they were prepared to respect that neutrality; and he quoted the replies: France had promised to do so, Germany had delayed replying. Belgium had promised neutrality. But Germany had sent Belgium an ultimatum; and the British Government had been asked in the past week whether an assurance would satisfy it that Belgian integrity would be preserved after the war. It had replied refusing to barter away its interests or obligations in Belgian neutrality. The King of the Belgians had that day telegraphed to King George, appealing to the British Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. Great Britain had great and vital interests in the independence of Belgium, and integrity was the least part of that independence. Compliance with the ultimatum would be fatal to that independence, and that of Holland would then perish also.