If _any_ experience, then a _determinate_ experience; and this determinateness is the only, and is the adequate, principle of control, or “objectivity.” The experience may be of the vaguest sort. I may not see anything which I can identify as a familiar object--a table, a chair, etc. It may be dark; I may have only the vaguest impression that there is something which looks like a table. Or I may be completely befogged and confused, as when one rises quickly from sleep in a pitch-dark room. But this vagueness, this doubtfulness, this confusion is the thing experienced, and, _qua_ real, is as “good” a reality as the self-luminous vision of an Absolute. It is not just vagueness, doubtfulness, confusion, at large or in general. It is _this_ vagueness, and no other; absolutely unique, absolutely what _it_ is.[53] Whatever gain in clearness, in fullness, in trueness of content is experienced must grow out of some element in the experience of _this_ experienced _as_ what it is. To return to the illusion: If the experience of the lines as convergent is illusory, it is because of some elements in the thing as experienced, not because of something defined in terms of externality to this particular experience. If the illusoriness can be detected, it is because the thing experienced is real, having within its experienced reality elements whose _own mutual_ tension effects its reconstruction. Taken concretely, the experience of convergent lines contains within itself the elements of the transformation of its own content. It is _this_ thing, and not some separate truth, that clamors for its own reform. There is, then, from the empiricist’s point of view, no need to search for some aboriginal _that_ to which all successive experiences are attached, and which is somehow thereby undergoing continuous change. Experience is always of _thats_; and the most comprehensive and inclusive experience of the universe that the philosopher himself can obtain is the experience of a characteristic _that_. From the empiricist’s point of view, this is as true of the exhaustive and complete insight of a hypothetical all-knower as of the vague, blind experience of the awakened sleeper. As reals, they stand on the same level. As trues, the latter has by definition the better of it; but if this insight is in any way the truth of the blind awakening, it is because the latter has, in its _own_ determinate _quale_, elements of real continuity with the former; it is, _ex hypothesi_, transformable through a series of experienced reals without break of continuity, into the absolute thought-experience. There is no need of logical manipulation to effect the transformation, nor _could_ any logical consideration effect it. If effected at all it is just by immediate experiences, each of which is just as real (no more, no less) as either of the two terms between which they lie. Such, at least, is the meaning of the empiricist’s contention. So, when he talks of experience, he does not mean some grandiose, remote affair that is cast like a net around a succession of fleeting experiences; he does not mean an indefinite total, comprehensive experience which somehow engirdles an endless flux; he means that _things_ are what they are experienced to be, and that every experience is _some_ thing.
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The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy — Part 105
2026-11-16 08:45:20 · Cedar Herald Index
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