It would have been better, no doubt, to have had an agreement made before the trade was opened, but the eagerness of both sides may not easily be restrained. Whether it is practicable for Congress to stop the trade, I know not, or whether it would be expedient if practicable, I doubt.
The balance of parties in England is so nicely poised, that the smallest weight shifts the scales. In truth nothing can be done without changing the Ministry, for whatever is done raises a cry sufficient to shake those who do it. In this situation, it is a question whether it is best to keep things in suspense, or bring them to a decision. If Congress were to prohibit all trade with England, until a Treaty of Commerce were made, or some temporary convention at least, it might bring on a decision, by exciting a cry against the Ministry for not making a convention. But the moment a convention is made, a cry will be raised against them for making it. The present Ministry, to judge by their motions hitherto, will hazard the clamor for not making one, rather than that for making one. They think it least dangerous to them, especially since they have seen so many American vessels arrive in England, and have heard, that British ships are admitted to an entry in the ports of America, particularly Philadelphia.
The most difficult thing to adjust in a Treaty of Commerce, will be the communications we shall have with the West India Islands. This is of great importance to us, and to the islands, and I think to Great Britain too. Yet there is a formidable party for excluding us at least from carrying the produce of those islands to Great Britain.
Much will depend upon the Minister you first send to London. An American Minister would be a formidable person to any British Minister whatever. He would converse with all parties, and if he is a prudent, cautious man, he would at this moment have more influence there than you can imagine.
We are chained here on the only spot in the world, where we can be of no use. If my colleagues were of my mind, we would all go together to London, where we could negotiate the Definitive Treaty, and talk of arrangements of commerce to some purpose. However, one Minister in London, with proper instructions, would do better than four. He would have the artifices of French emissaries to counteract, as well as English partizans; for you may depend upon it, the French see with pleasure the improbability of our coming soon and cordially together, as they saw with manifest regret, the appearances of cordial reconciliation under the former administration. These sentiments are not unnatural, but we are under no obligation, from mere complaisance, to sacrifice interests of such deep and lasting consequence. For it is not merely mercantile profit and convenience, that is at stake; future wars, long and bloody wars, may be either avoided or entailed upon our posterity, as we conduct wisely or otherwise the present negotiation with Great Britain.