How we shall determine, I cannot say. For my own part, I see no harm in accepting the mediation, nor any other good, than a compliment to the two empires. In Europe it may be thought an honor to us, and, therefore, I shall give my voice, as at present informed, in favor of it, as it seems rather to be the inclination of the Count de Vergennes that we should.

Your late despatches, Sir, are not well adapted to give spirits to a melancholy man, or to cure one sick with a fever. It is not possible for me, at present, to enter into a long detail in answer to them. You will be answered, I suppose, by all the gentlemen jointly. In the meantime, I beg leave to say to you a few words upon two points.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution — Part 51

1st. The separate article never appeared to me of any consequence to conceal from this Court. It was an agreement we had a right to make; it contained no injury to France or Spain. Indeed, I know not what France has, or ever had, to do with it. If it had been communicated to this Court, it would probably have been communicated to Spain, and she might have thought more about it than it was worth. But how you could conceive it possible for us to treat at all with the English, upon supposition, that we had communicated every, the minutest thing, to this Court, when this Court were neither obliged, nor thought proper, to communicate anything whatever to us, I know not. We were bound by treaty no more than they to communicate. The instructions were found to be absolutely impracticable. That they were too suddenly published, is very true.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution — Part 51

2dly. A communication of the treaty to this Court, after it was agreed upon, and before it was signed, would have infallibly prevented the whole peace. In the first place, it was very doubtful, or rather, on the contrary, it is certain, the English Minister never would have consented that we should have communicated it. We might, it is true, have done it without his consent or knowledge; but what would have been the consequence? The French Minister would have said, the terms were very good for us, but we must not sign till they signed; and this would have been the continuance of the war for another year, at least. It was not so much from an apprehension, that the French would have exerted themselves to get away from us terms that were agreed on, that they were withheld. It was then too late, and we have reasons to apprehend, that all of this kind had been done, which could be done. We knew they were often insinuating to the British Ministers things against us, respecting the fisheries, tories, &c. during the negotiation, and Mr Fitzherbert told me, that the Count de Vergennes had "fifty times reproached him for ceding the fisheries, and said it was ruining the English and French commerce both." It was not suspicion, it was certain knowledge, that they were against us on the points of the tories, fisheries, Mississippi, and the western country.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution — Part 51