[654] In Peck _v._ Peck (1880), 12 _R. I._, 485-89, the court declined to decide whether a common-law contract is valid, there being no prohibitory language in the statute. _Cf._ also S. _v._ Boyle (1882), 13 _R. I._, 537; and Ben. Association _v._ Carpenter (1892), 17 _R. I._, 720. In Williams _v._ Herrick (1899), 21 _R. I._, 401-3, the court appears to favor the validity of a marriage without a formal ceremony, if begun with "matrimonial intent."
[655] According to Connors _v._ Connors (1895), 40 _Pac._, 966, a license is not essential in Wyoming.
[656] In Beverlin _v._ Beverlin, 29 _W. Va._, 736, the judge says, "I have been unable to find any case in which the courts of Virginia or this state have ever held that a common-law marriage was held valid;" and this, he adds, is "persuasive evidence" that it is not. In Colston _v._ Quander (1877), 1 _Va. Decisions_ (not officially reported), license is declared not essential; but in this case there was a formal celebration. On the probable position of the states which have not decided see COOK, _The Mar. Cel. in the U. S._, 525, 526.
It appears, then--to summarize the details presented in the foregoing discussion--that twenty-three states and territories have already sanctioned or favored the common-law marriage; while twelve others are soon likely to do so, unless the statutes shall be changed. On the contrary, eighteen commonwealths have repudiated or are inclined to repudiate the informal agreement. Six of these, it should be noted, have liberated themselves by statute; five--Mississippi, California, Utah, New York, and Porto Rico[657]--having done so within the last ten years. This is a fact of vast social importance. From it the reformer may gather new courage. In such legislation, in response to a better-educated popular sentiment, lies the hope of the future: to free American society from the manifold evils which lurk in the doctrine of the common-law marriage. It is, indeed, marvelous that a progressive people with respect to an institution which is the very basis of the social order should so long neglect the function of proper public control. For what, according to its nature, is the common-law marriage? Its possibilities for anarchy are realistically described by Chief Justice Folger, of New York, in 1880, when that state was still exposed to them. "A man and a woman," he declares, "who are competent to marry each other, without going before a minister or magistrate, without the presence of any person as a witness, with no previous public notice given, with no form or ceremony, civil or religious, and with no record or written evidence of the act kept, and merely by words of present contract between them, may take upon themselves the relation of husband and wife, and be bound to themselves, to the state, and to society."[658] Verily this is individualism absolutely unrestrained! It is the simple truth, as already suggested, that in principle the canon law as it existed in Catholic lands before the Council of Trent, and in England until the marriage act of 1753, with a possibility of all of its attendant scandals and hardships, still survives in the United States.[659] The apology of the Middle Ages was found in the sacramental dogma. Matrimony as such, under whatever conditions contracted, was too "holy" to be dissolved or effectively hindered for the ordinary prudential reasons which appeal to the statesman or legislator. Today there is doubtless a lingering tradition of the same false sentiment. Yet the common-law marriage is now supported on two principal grounds. The innocent offspring, we are told, ought not to suffer because the parents have neglected the formalities prescribed by a mere statute. Moreover, to declare an irregular, perhaps a clandestine, union void is to invade the most sacred right of the individual. There is urgent need that the American people should realize the fallacy of such arguments. Far better that the children of a delinquent minority should bear the stain of illegitimacy than that the welfare of the whole social body should be endangered. For the same reason the supposed right of the individual must yield to the higher claims of society. In no part of the whole range of human activity is there such imperative need of state interference and control as in the sphere of the matrimonial relations. In this field as in others we are beginning to see more clearly that the highest individual liberty can be secured only when it is subordinated to the highest social good. It is, however, not merely the public which suffers. "Our common-law marriage fails to protect not only the contracting parties, but also the families to which they belong.