DR. STAHMER: How do you explain the big fires that still broke out in Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: When I received the report from the formation I was very pleasantly surprised to learn that the effect of the bombing was confined to the target area, but this war has shown that most of the destruction is not caused by the bombs themselves, but by the spreading of fires. Unfortunately a bomb had hit a margarine or some other factory in Rotterdam, causing oil to run out and the fire to spread. As after the attack the capitulation was already effective, it should have been possible to prevent the fires from spreading by bringing in the fire services and the troops.
DR. STAHMER: What were the military consequences of this attack?
KESSELRING: The immediate consequence of the attack was the surrender of the Rotterdam troops. General Wenninger, who was air attaché at the time and who later was attached to my air fleet, told me that in consequence of this attack the whole of the Dutch Army capitulated.
DR. STAHMER: Did you lead the attack on Coventry in November 1940?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 2 I took part in this attack, without any doubt. I cannot say now whether Air Fleet 3 took part in it as well, but I did.
DR. STAHMER: What was the object of the attack?
KESSELRING: According to the target index kept by the archives department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Coventry was an English armament center; it was known as “Little Essen.” This index was compiled with meticulous care by experts, engineers, and officers, and contained maps, charts, photographs, description of targets, key points, _et cetera_. I myself, as well as my men, was fully familiar with these details. Furthermore, I had the aforementioned General Wenninger and several engineers with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe give lectures to the troops about targets, in order to make them acquainted with the nature of the targets, their vulnerability, and the effects of an air attack.
Preparations for an attack were made most conscientiously. I was very often present and the Reich Marshal himself occasionally inspected them. The case of Coventry was extremely simple, as during those nights favorable weather conditions prevailed, so that Coventry could be reached without radio navigation. The distribution of the targets in Coventry was likewise very simple, so that bombs could be dropped without the help of flares, and it was hardly possible to miss the target. But bombs follow the same law as other projectiles; in other words, in land and air warfare dispersion covers a wide range. With an air force this is the further peculiarity that if strong formations are employed not the individual target but only the target area as a whole can be aimed at, which naturally causes a deviation from the target itself. By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and on the reconnaissance pilot’s own initiative, all hits and attacks were checked the following day by air photographs. The ground visibility was good but, as I already said in the case of Rotterdam, the destruction of the objective was not caused so much by the bombs themselves as by the spreading of fire.