On June 8, 1967, Israel attacked the USS Liberty. Thirty-four American soldiers were killed and 171 were wounded. More than 35 years have passed since that sunny afternoon, but for Joe Meadors, a U.S. Navy signalman on the bridge of the Liberty during the attack, the memories of that tragic day are still fresh.

Israeli planes had circled the Liberty at several points during the morning. When the ship?s radar picked up more aircraft coming up the Liberty?s starboard side, Meadors said the crew assumed it was another reconnaissance mission.

Questions Remain about 1967 Attack on USS Liberty - 2003-02-21

?So what we did was a bunch of us ran up to the Signal Bridge to observe what we thought would just be another circling of the ship,? he said. ?The aircraft came up our starboard side pretty low to the surface. They got directly in front of us and turned immediately left and started strafing us from stem to stern.?

Questions Remain about 1967 Attack on USS Liberty - 2003-02-21

It was the height of the Cold War in June 1967 when the Liberty, a Navy ship outfitted with highly sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment, was on a mission for the secretive National Security Agency. The Liberty had been patrolling off the Egyptian coast in international waters when the Six Day War between Israel and her Arab neighbors broke out. The United States, fearful of being drawn into the conflict, sent as many as five cables to the Liberty to pull back at least 160 kilometers off the coast.

Questions Remain about 1967 Attack on USS Liberty - 2003-02-21

A. Jay Cristol, a federal judge and author of the book said a series of communications failures diverted those messages to the Philippines.

?The messages were sent to the Naval Communications Station Philippines,? he said. ?Because unbelievable as it may sound, there was no protocol for sending messages to a naval ship from the Army communications station in the Pentagon.?

Judge Cristol, who spent 10 years researching his book, argues that the attack was a tragic mistake and there is no evidence revealing it was intentional. He writes that the Israeli strike can only be understood in the context of the Cold War; the outbreak of war in the Middle East; and the chaos of the battlefield.

Ambassador Richard Parker, the former political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo in 1967, agrees. He says the White House and the U.S. Navy did a poor job of informing the public and the Liberty crew about what had happened. But he thinks this had more to do with the highly sensitive nature of the National Security Agency and not because the Israelis had deliberately attacked the Liberty.

?I think it was a case of mistaken identity. I don?t see a motive for it,? the ambassador said. ?I don?t see what the pay off would be for the Israelis. It would be a very reckless thing for them to do unless they felt that they had a very serious national interest at stake, and I don?t see what that interest was."

"The explanation most people give is that they didn?t want us listening to their radio traffic. The weakness of the argument in my view is that the Israelis had convinced themselves already that they had a green light from us to do what they did," he said. "The war was practically over at that point on the Egyptian front and they were about to start the attack on Syria, but they had not yet decided whether to do that. They had already told us, however, that they were considering doing that. We?d had a chance to object and we did not.?

Liberty survivors have a hard time believing the official explanation. They have formed the and are circulating a petition asking the U.S. Congress to undertake and conduct a complete and comprehensive public congressional investigation of the attack.

They say previous investigations were limited and looked only into communications failures and damage control procedures. They call the one investigation that recorded the survivors? testimony, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, a sham whose results were predetermined.

Rear Admiral Merlin Staring was the staff legal officer to Admiral John McCain, who convened the court of inquiry. His job was to review the court?s findings before they were presented to Admiral McCain. But Mr. Staring says the findings were taken from him before he finished his review. Merlin Staring thinks it?s because he had some problems with the report.

?My principal job was to determine whether the findings that the members of the court of inquiry had chosen to record were supported by the evidence that they had gathered and had included in their record,? he recalled.