Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the Court's opinion is flatly inconsistent with our statutory analysis in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Because I disagree with that analysis, however, and because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language at issue in this case, I concur in the judgment.
In Christiansburg, the Court interpreted the attorney's fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . . . as part of the costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III). In this case, the Court construes the attorney's fee provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that "the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." 17 U.S.C. § 505. As the Court observes, the two provisions contain "virtually identical language." Ante, at 5. After today's decision, however, they will have vastly different meanings.
Under the Title VII provision, a prevailing plaintiff "ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances," Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 417, whereas a prevailing defendant is to be awarded fees only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id., at 421. By contrast, under the Court's decision today, prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the copyright context "are to be treated alike," and "attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion." Ante, at 17-18.
Interestingly, the Court does not mention, let alone discuss, Christiansburg's statutory analysis. We began that analysis by considering the Christiansburg petitioner's argument:
"Relying on what it terms `the plain meaning of the statute,' [petitioner] argues that the language of [the attorney's fee provision] admits of only one interpretation: `A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.' " 434 U. S., at 418.
We summarily rejected this contention, stating that "the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let alone require, such a mechanical construction." Ibid. We opined that the language "provide[s] no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to attorney's fees." Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Turning to the "equitable considerations" embodied in the statute's policy objectives and legislative history, id., at 418-420, we stated that those considerations counseled against petitioner's position—a position we concluded was "untenable." Id., at 419.
Today, confronting a provision "virtually identical" to that at issue in Christiansburg, the Court adopts precisely the interpretation that Christiansburg rejected as "mechanical" and "untenable." The Court states that "the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner's claim for disapproving the dual standard," ante, at 17, and that the language "gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently than successful defendants." Ante, at 5. Thus, the Court replaces the "dual" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit with an "evenhanded" approach, under which district courts will apply the same standard to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants when deciding whether to award fees. Ante, at 17-18, and n. 19.
It is difficult to see how the Court, when faced with "virtually identical" language in two provisions, can hold that a given interpretation is required by the "plain language" in one instance, but reject that same interpretation as "mechanical" and "untenable" in the other. After today's decision, Congress could employ the same terminology in two different attorney's fee statutes, but be quite uncertain as to whether the Court would adopt a " dual" standard (that is, reject the "mechanical" construction), or apply an " evenhanded" rule (that is, adopt the "plain meaning").