In connection with a larger research paper, I recently emailed with Maksim Kononenko (@kononenkome), to learn more about his views on “non-oppositionist” blogging and online social movements. Kononenko is widely considered to be one of the RuNet’s pioneers, and has worked as a publicist, a columnist, a programmer, and a television host, among other things. He is a self-described “liberal,” though his political positions place him squarely outside the Russian opposition. Many thanks to Maksim Vitalyevich for taking the time to answer my questions! (Thanks also to RuNet Echo colleague Andrey Tselikov for polishing my questions in Russian.) I hope readers enjoy our conversation as much as I did. Maksim Kononenko, photo by M.K., used with permission. Kevin Rothrock: Greetings, Maksim Vitalyevich! I'm trying to understand if it's possible to argue that non-oppositionist bloggers in Russia constitute a social movement. Scholars and journalists generally assume that the non-establishment Russian opposition is a social movement, however splintered and weak. I want to know what can be said of their online adversaries. One of the most famous definitions of social movements belongs to Charles Tilly. He argued that social movements combine the following factors: 1. A sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target audiences: a campaign 2. Employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering: the social-movement's repertoire 3. Participants’ concerted public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies: WUNC displays Question One. Do you think Tilly's definition [of a social movement] characterizes your work as a blogger? Or maybe just a part of his concept relates to your work? Or are the Tilly's factors entirely unconnected to your blogging? I assume that Tilly's definition isn't a perfect match, especially since political blogging is a relatively new phenomenon, done online and not on the street, where traditional “movement” activity takes place. So, even if you think most of Tilly's definition is non-applicable, I'm interested to know if you think some of it does describe your efforts as a blogger. Question Two. Regardless of whether or not you think that non-oppositionist bloggers constitute a social movement, what is your attitude about classifying certain bloggers as members of a social movement? Do you think this can be done scientifically, or is the entire enterprise a political game of glorifying certain individuals and vilifying others? Maksim Kononenko: I hope you understand one important, fundamental thing about Russia: twenty years ago, we all lived in the Soviet Union. It was a rather peculiar society, thoroughly miserable on a quality-of-life level, but consequently quite equal socially. That is to say, everyone lived poorly equally, but—inasmuch as they all lived this way—this everyday misery did not particularly bother anyone. Then, literally in an instant (in a matter of weeks during the winter of 1992), everything changed radically. Our society sharply divided into those who could adapt to the new, antisocial conditions (a minority), and those who continued to live as they had before (the vast majority). Those who continued to live as before greatly envied those who adapted. They envied their cars, their changing living conditions, their visits abroad. This envy bred the colossal social tensions of the 1990s—an era when virtually all income was viciously redistributed to those who had adapted (especially to the very few called “oligarchs”). And then Putin arrived. And the price of oil rose. Putin moved to nationalize the oligarchs’ enterprises. And the offices of state enterprises grew many times over. That is, there were several times more people among whom to redistribute profits. And so the bureaucracy grew in step. All this, plus total corruption, still further increased the number of citizens reaching for crumbs of the great oil pie. And the social situation paradoxically balanced out. Bit by bit, money trickled out to the regions. People gained confidence about a tomorrow (this was impossible under Yeltsin), and started making plans, having children, borrowing on credit, buying cars and apartments, and building homes. And, to this day, the overwhelming majority of the country's population is busy doing just that: buying and spending, in an effort to catch up to what people were denied under the Soviet authorities and under Yeltsin.