[760] MILL, _Prin. of Pol. Econ._ (Boston, 1848), I, 413.
[761] FAWCETT, _Manual of Pol. Econ._ (4th ed., London, 1874), 143.
[762] BODIO, _Del Movimento della populazione in Italia e in altri stati d'Europa_ (1876), 136, 137; FARR, _Vital Statistics_, 68-75; and _idem_, in _Report of the Registrar General_: quoted by OGLE, "On Marriage Rates," etc., _Jour. of the Royal Statistical Society_, LIII, 254 ff. _Cf._ NEWSHOLME, _Vital Statistics_, 45, 46.
[763] OGLE, _op. cit._, 256-63. CAUDERLIER, _Les lois de la population_, 71-74, 113, 114, has also shown in the case of England that foreign commercial relations must be considered in determining the condition of material well-being.
[764] OETTINGEN, _Die Moralstatistik_, 89-94, and authorities there cited; BERTILLON, _Annales de démographie internationale_, I, 24; CAUDERLIER, _op. cit._, 61-78, 102 ff., giving statistics for Germany, Belgium, England, and France. _Cf._ MAYO-SMITH, _Statistics and Sociology_, 100, 101.
[765] OGLE, _op. cit._, 255; _cf._ OETTINGEN, _op. cit._, 93, 94.
[766] WILLCOX, "A Study in Vital Statistics," _Pol. Sci. Quart._, VIII, 76, 77. _Cf._ _idem_, "The Marriage Rate in Michigan," _Pub. Am. Stat. Assoc._, IV, 7; and CRUM, "The Marriage Rate in Massachusetts," _ibid._, 328, 329.
[767] WILLCOX, _loc. cit._, 76, 77, 79-82. On the increase of divorce among the southern negroes see _idem_, _The Divorce Problem_, 21-23, 29-32.
Whether the number of divorces is directly influenced by legislation is a question which has given rise to decided difference of opinion. Bertillon, writing in 1883 in favor of the new divorce law of France then under consideration, took the position that statutes extending the number of causes of divorce or relaxing the procedure in divorce suits have little influence "upon the increase in the number of decrees."[768] Yet, for obvious reasons, he predicted that the first, though not the lasting, result of a change in the law allowing absolute divorce instead of mere separation would be the opposite of this conclusion. Such, in fact, was the case. In 1883 there were 3,010 separations; while, after the new code took effect, 4,478 divorces and separations were granted in 1884, 6,245 in 1885, and 6,211 in the following year.[769] Only a part of this can be accounted for by the change in law, for there had been a rapid increase during the preceding fifty years.[770] For the United States this point has been examined by Professor Willcox, and his results go to show that the difference in the divorce rate existing among the states cannot very largely be accounted for by the difference in the number of grounds of petition sanctioned by the respective statutes. Thus in 1880 New York admitted one cause, New Jersey two causes, and Pennsylvania four; yet on the average in that year for each 100,000 married couples New York was granting 81 divorces, New Jersey 68, and Pennsylvania 111.[771] "This means that more divorces for adultery are granted in New York, relatively to population, than for adultery and desertion in New Jersey, and almost as many as for adultery, desertion, cruelty, and imprisonment in Pennsylvania. Assume the number of married couples in the three states in 1875 to be a mean between the estimates for 1870 and 1880, and compare with this mean the total number of divorces for adultery in the three states for the twenty years. Pennsylvania had annually 16 such divorces to 100,000 couples, New Jersey had 26, and New York 78. Judging from the court records, one would say that adultery was about three times as frequent in New York as in New Jersey, and about five times as frequent as in Pennsylvania. No such inference is warranted. The true conclusion is that limiting the causes increases the number of divorces in those which remain, but without materially affecting the total number. A certain proportion of the married couples in the three states desired divorce, and was willing to offer the evidence required in order to obtain the decree. The number of causes, then, seems to have affected the grounds urged for divorce, but in no large degree the total number."[772] It is possible that this conclusion is somewhat too emphatic. The problem is very complex, and it is hard to make allowance for all its conditions. For example, it should not be forgotten that New Jersey has but one tribunal, the court of chancery, authorized to grant divorce, whereas New York has many; and if states sanctioning a wider range of causes were selected for comparison, the result might be changed, though scarcely to any wide extent.