And as for Hume's argument to prove that we can never know any _external_ object to be causally connected with anything which we actually observe, it is, I think, obviously fallacious. In order to prove this, he has, as he recognises, to disprove both of two theories. He has, first of all, to disprove what he calls the vulgar theory--the theory that we can know the very things which we see or feel to be external objects; that is to say, can know that these very things exist at times when we do not observe them. And even here, I think, his arguments are obviously inconclusive. But we need not stay to consider them, because, in order to prove that we cannot know any external objects, he has also to disprove what he calls the philosophic theory--the theory that we can know things which we do observe, to be caused by external objects which we never observe. If, therefore, his attempt to disprove this theory fails, his proof that we cannot know any external objects also fails; and I think it is easy to see that his disproof does fail. It amounts merely to this: That we cannot, _ex hypothesi,_ ever observe these supposed external objects, and therefore cannot observe them to be constantly conjoined with any objects which we do observe. But what follows from this? His own theory about the knowledge of causal connection is not that in order to know A to be the cause of B, we must have observed A _itself_ to be conjoined with B; but only that we must have observed objects _like_ A to be constantly conjoined with objects _like_ B. And what is to prevent an external object from being _like_ some object which we have formerly observed? Suppose I have frequently observed a fact _like A_ to be conjoined with a fact _like_ B: and suppose I now observe B, on an occasion when I do not observe anything like A. There is no reason, on Hume's principles, why I should not conclude that A does exist on this occasion, even though I do not observe it; and that it is, therefore, an external object. It will, of course, differ from any object which I have ever observed, in respect of the simple fact that it is _not_ observed by me, whereas they were. There is, therefore, this one respect in which it must be _unlike_ anything which I have ever observed. But Hume has never said anything to show that unlikeness in this single respect is sufficient to invalidate the inference. It may quite well be like objects which I have observed in all other respects; and this degree of likeness may, according to his principles, be quite sufficient to justify us in concluding its existence. In short, when Hume argues that we cannot possibly learn by experience of the existence of any external objects, he is, I think, plainly committing the fallacy of supposing that, because we cannot, _ex hypothesis_ have ever observed any object which actually is "external," therefore we can never have observed any object _like_ an external one. But plainly we may have observed objects like them in all respects except the single one that these have been observed whereas the others have not. And even a less degree of likeness than this would, according to his principles, be quite sufficient to justify an inference of causal connection.
Crime Journal
Philosophical Studies — Part 93
2026-11-16 05:18:21 · Cedar Herald Index
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