[Sidenote: Enemy cavalry treated to some shells.]
JULY 30.--Sent out a reconnoitering party of Cavalry, and directed the Officer so to approach the enemy's Camp as to try and draw him out, which he did very successfully, giving us an excellent opportunity of treating him with good effect to a few shells. General Burrows and I urged on General Primrose the absolute necessity for turning out of the City the whole of the Pathans, and he authorized us to go to the Political Officer and the Wali, and urge the great importance of this matter, and notify his determination to have it carried out. A little explanation on this subject is necessary. The population of the City of Kandahar is made up of three sections, the largest of which are Pathans, who are all Orthodox Mahomedans, very bitter against all foreigners or infidels, and our irreconcilable enemies. The next are the Moghuls or Parsiwans, who, though Mahomedans, are accounted a species of dissenter by the true Mahomedans, and hated and persecuted by them accordingly. Their sympathies are therefore (speaking comparatively) with us. The third and last are the Hindoo Merchants, an influential and numerous community, settlers from India, intent only on making money, despised by both sects of Mahomedans, who, in turn, prey on them and rob them. They are quite valueless as friends or foes, but such as they were their feelings are with us. The Pathans, to a man, were our enemies, and their presence in the City our deadliest danger, and it seemed to me quite useless to fortify our position or take measures against the enemy without, if we wilfully permitted a base and treacherous foe to remain within, our walls. The measure of turning out many innocent people was a hard and painful one, but it was one on which our very existence rested, and so I was most urgent on the point. As
[Sidenote: Politicals objected to Pathan ejectment.]
I expected, the Political Officers objected, and tried to persuade us that the risk was imaginary, &c. However, I was firm, and after a long and hot conversation which, at one time, seemed likely to culminate in a row, I carried the day, and an order was issued that all Pathans (men) should leave the City, and that in the afternoon search parties would go round to ascertain that the order was being obeyed. This unpleasant duty was confided to me, and I made all preparations for resistance, but in no case met with any, and it was clear the exodus had commenced, and eventually resulted in about 12,000 persons leaving the City of their own free will. This was a gain not only in getting rid of a certain set of desperate enemies, but also in reducing the number of mouths to be fed and supplied with water, the latter more especially. Though this was a good beginning, I was by no means satisfied that all the dangerous element had been removed, and from time to time persistently urged my views to this effect, until eventually it seemed we had reduced the evil to a minimum. I cannot say that even yet (written August 14th) I am quite satisfied, but I hope and believe the internal danger is greatly reduced. Throughout we got no hearty assistance from the Political Officers, the Wali, or the City Authorities, the Chief of which (called the Kotwal) is, I believe, the prime villain of the lot, and I informed Colonel St. John (the Political Officer) that I considered he ought to be arrested, and that I should myself, on my own responsibility, assuredly seize him if there was the sign of an emeute in the town. I have no doubt Colonel St. John will hereafter try to prove I was too decided, and too hard in this matter, but I am convinced I was right, and only wish I had more certainty that we were as safe from danger from within as he tries to make me believe. If I were General Primrose I would relieve him of all political powers while the present state of affairs lasted, and constitute myself _only_ and chief Political Officer, and this I have urged on him. When I found it quite impossible, as it seemed to be at first, to move the Pathans out, I threatened (having received authority from General Primrose to act as might seem best) to throw a few shells into the Pathan quarter, and certainly would have done so when all other means failed, but never desired or wished to resort to so extreme a measure until all fair means had been tried.