They that write most for gentlenesse in traine reserue place for the rod, and we that vse the terme of seueritie recommend curtesie to the maisters discretion. Here is the oddes: they will seeme to be curteous in termes, and yet the force of the matter makes them confesse the neede of the rod: we vse sharp termes, and yet yeilde to curtesie more, then euen the verie patrones of curtesie do, for all their curifauour.
Wherin we haue more reason to harp on the harder stringe for the trueth of the matter, then they to touch but the softer, so to please the person: seeing they conspire with vs in the last conclusion, that both correction and curtesie be referred to discretion. Curtesie goeth before, and ought to guide the discourse, when reason is obeyed which is very seldome: but the corruptnesse in nature, the penalties in lawe, courage to enflame, desire to entice, and so many euilles assailing one good do enforce me to build my discourse vpon feare, and leaue curtesie to consideration: as the bare one reason of reason obeyed, a thing still wished, but seldome wel willed, doth cause some curteous conceit, not much acquainted with the kinde of gouernment, vpon some plausible liking, to make curtesie the outside, and keepe canuase for the lyning: but euer still for the last staffe to make discretion the refuge. Wherin we agree, though I priuately chide him, and saye why dissemble ye? Vnder hand he aunswereth me, I lend the world some wordes, but I will witnesse with you, I do not speake against discrete correction, but against hastinesse, and crueltie. Sir I know none, that will either set correction or curtesie at to much libertie, but with distinction, vpon whom they be both to be exercised: neither yet any, that will praise cruelty: and all those, that write of this argument, whether Philosophers or others allow of punishment, though they differ in the kinde.