On the afternoon of March 14, 1957, the S. S. Grelmarion was berthed at Galveston, Texas, taking on a cargo of wheat from a pierside grain elevator owned and operated by the city. The wheat was being loaded directly from the elevator into the ship by means of a spout. The petitioners were longshoremen engaged in 'trimming' the wheat as it was received in the offshore bin of the vessel's No. 2 hold, which was then about three-quarters full. A last 'shot' of grain was called for and was released into the bin. The grain in this last shot had been treated with a chemical insecticide, and the petitioners were injured by fumes from the chemical, made noxious by concentration in the closely confined area where they were working.
The petitioners brought the present suit against the City of Galveston and the owner of the vessel to recover for their injuries. Their claim was predicated upon the negligence of the City and the shipowner, and upon the unseaworthiness of the ship. After an extended trial, the District Court entered judgment for the respondents, based upon detailed findings of fact, D.C., 181 F.Supp. 202, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 5 Cir., 275 F.2d 191. On certiorari (364 U.S. 295, 81 S.Ct. 107, 5 L.Ed.2d 84) we vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration in the light of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941, which had been decided in the interim. That court, one judge dissenting, was of the view that Mitchell was inapplicable to the facts of the present case, and again affirmed the District Court's judgment, 5 Cir., 291 F.2d 97. We granted certiorari to consider a seemingly significant question of admiralty law. 368 U.S. 816, 82 S.Ct. 104, 7 L.Ed.2d 23.
The factual issues bearing upon the alleged negligence of the City and shipowner were determined in their favor by the District Court. Specifically, the court found that the City had not itself applied the fumigant to the grain in question, and that neither of the respondents knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the grain had been improperly fumigated at an inland point by someone else. Even a cursory examination of the lengthy record shows that these findings were based upon substantial evidence. They were re-examined and affirmed on appeal. We cannot say that they were clearly erroneous. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20-21, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20.
Of greater significance in this litigation is the issue which prompted our remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. Briefly stated, the question is whether, upon the facts as found by the District Court, it was error to hold that the Grelmarion was seaworthy at the time the petitioners were injured.
In the Mitchell case, supra, we reversed a judgment for the defendant, because the District Court and the Court of Appeals had mistakenly imported concepts of common-law negligence into an action for unseaworthiness. There the jury had erroneously been instructed that liability for unseaworthiness could attach only if the alleged unseaworthy condition was 'there for a reasonably long period of time so that a shipowner ought to have seen that it was removed.' The Court of Appeals had affirmed on the theory that, at least as to an unseaworthy condition that arises during the progress of the voyage, the shipowner's obligation 'is merely to see that reasonable care is used under the circumstances * * * incident to the correction of the newly arisen defect.' It was alleged in that case that a ship's rail which was habitually used as a means of egress to the dock was rendered unseaworthy by the presence of slime and gurry. We did not decide the issue, but reversed for a new trial under proper criteria, holding that the shipowner's actual or constructive knowledge of the unseaworthy condition is not essential to his liability, and that he has an absolute duty 'to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use.' 362 U.S., at 550, 80 S.Ct. at 933.