With this condition of affairs in a province most open to outside influence and trans-Oxus intrigue, it becomes of serious moment to consider what modification of our policy, as set forth in the Proclamation of October 28th, is necessary. The Proclamation concluded as follows:—“_The services of such sirdars and chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognized; but all disturbers of the peace, and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority, will meet with condign punishment. The British Government, after consultation with the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people._” Now these stilted periods either mean a great deal, or nothing at all. As regards Turkistan there are within it at the present moment numerous “disturbers of the peace,” as there are in Kohistan, Maidan, and Logar; and, to be consistent, we must fulfil our pledge to punish them condignly; if not now, at some future date. But these disturbers have this much in their favour, that beyond the empty words of the Proclamation they have had no evidence of the British authority which has supplanted that of the Amir. To them it is non-existent. It may flourish within 20 miles of Cabul and eastwards along the Jellalabad Valley to the Khyber, but it has never shown itself north of the Hindu Kush: it has left Balkh and Herat untouched: it has not been felt at Bamian or Ghazni, each within 100 miles of the 7,000 men encamped at Sherpur: how, then, is it to be acknowledged at more distant points? An authority, to be respected, must be tangible. The British authority at Cabul is in the tangible shape of a conquering army: it is respected—at Cabul. But Cabul is not Turkistan, and it is idle to expect a Proclamation, or even a thousand, to cause provincial governors, now free from all control, voluntarily to submit to an authority which makes, apparently, no effort to reach them. “Consultation with the principal sirdars and tribal chiefs representing the various provinces and cities of Afghanistan” is admirable from the view of closet politicians, but how if sirdars and chiefs decline to consult? It may have been intended, when the Proclamation was issued, that a demonstration of force should be made to bring about the consultation, but that demonstration has never been carried out—probably as much from political considerations as military difficulties. Sir Frederick Roberts and his army did their first work of capturing Cabul with such rapidity that, with troops pushed forward from Jellalabad to garrison the captured city and collect supplies for the winter, they might have ventured into Turkistan with the prospect of meeting with no opposition; and there might have been now, at Bamian and Balkh, agents who had been installed by our army and left in the position of governors ruling in our name. This programme was believed at one time to be on the cards, and we calculated how many marches it was to Bamian and the Oxus; but with no supports forthcoming up to the middle of November (a flying column at Jugdulluck was not worthy of the name), and with the usual stupid outcry at home against even the appearance of annexation, the project fell through. An attempt has been made to carry out the spirit of the Proclamation—to make “permanent arrangements for the good government of the people”—by consulting with such sirdars as have deemed it wise to join us. From their number four men have been chosen as governors of districts; but, so far, this system has been a failure. However much they may represent us, they are rejected of the people; and the three who, to use an official phrase, have “joined their appointments,” have had a very rough time of it. These were Shahbaz Khan, Mahomed Hasan Khan, and Abdulla Khan, all sirdars of local influence about Cabul, who were posted to Kohistan, Maidan, and Logar, respectively. (Turkistan, so far, has not received its governor, Sirdar Wali Mahomed, who had made many preparations for starting.) They were sent without armed escorts, and have been worried and threatened by malcontents, who have resented their intrusion with menaces that can scarcely be lightly regarded. In one case, that of Hasan Khan, son of Dost Mahomed and half-brother of Wali Mahomed, assassination has been added to threats. News was brought in from Naure Falad, the village in the Maidan Valley which General Baker’s force only left on the 1st instant, that a body of men, including some sepoys of the Ardal Regiments, had attacked the fort in which Hasan Khan was living, and had murdered our lately-appointed governor and one of his followers.