The contract of the appellant was to deliver the two thousand barrels of salt at Chicago to the cosignee named, 'the dangers of lake navigation only excepted,' and whether the failure to deliver was caused by the excepted dangers is now the only question. A loss by a jettison occasioned by a peril of the sea is, in ordinary cases, a loss by perils of the sea. But it is well settled that, if a jettison of a cargo, or a part of it, is rendered necessary by any fault or breach of contract of the master or owners of the vessel, the jettison must be attributed to that fault, or breach of contract, rather than to the sea peril, though that may also be present, and enter into the case. This is a principle alike applicable to exceptions in bills of lading and in policies of insurance. Though the peril of the sea may be nearer in time to the disaster, the efficient cause, without which the peril would not have been incurred, is regarded as the proximate cause of the loss. And there is, perhaps, greater reason for applying the rule to exceptions in contracts of common carriers than to those in policies of insurance, for in general, negligence of the insured does not relieve an underwriter, while a common carrier may not, even by stipulation, relieve himself from the consequences of his own fault.
In view of this recognized construction given to such clauses in bills of lading as 'perils of the sea excepted,' or, as in this case, 'the dangers of lake navigation only excepted,' it is plain that the appellant has shown no sufficient excuse for the failure to deliver the salt to the consignee of the libellant.