In the absence of actual returns, I believe that the force, which left Cabul, was nearly as follows:--

4 Horse Artillery guns. 3 Mountain Train do. Bengal Sappers & Miners 20 Shah Shoojah's do. 250 Queen's 44th 600 1 Troop H. A. 80 5th Cavalry 260 1st Local Horse 70 4th Local Horse 70 Envoy's Escort 70 2nd Shah's Cavalry 500 Half Mountain Train 30 5th N. I. 700 37th Do. 600 54th Do. 650 6th Shah's 600

A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 1841-2 — Part 219

At the last stand, on the hill at Gundamuk, there remained--

A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 1841-2 — Part 219

20 Officers. 50 men of the 54th. 6 of the Horse Artillery. 4 or 5 Sipahees. 300 Camp followers.

A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 1841-2 — Part 219

In reading over these Notes, I believe I have not done justice to some of the men who were our fellow-captives. The day after that on which Saleh Mahommed Khan offered them the arms, a few men of the artillery, and perhaps, in all, half a dozen others, asked for and obtained them. Swords were difficult to procure for the officers: Lieut. Eyre, not being able to get one, took a musket; which was very troublesome and heavy; as, from the wound he received at Cabul, he has lost the use of one hand.

It is now said, that though we all at the time believed Saleh Mahommed's assertion, that Akbar ordered the death of those who could not march, it is probable that this was a fiction. No one actually _read_ the letter, that I can discover: and he probably wished to enhance the value of his releasing us. The order for our being sent to Khoolloom was read by several of the officers.

Here follow copies of a few notes that have been recovered. The first is not dated; but, if I mistake not, I have made allusion to the order for cutting away the weeds that grew on the ramparts; lest they should facilitate the enemy's entrance into the cantonments. The Affghans had first to cross the ditch, twenty feet wide.

Has the breastwork on the Musjid been improved? This Lieut. Sturt was to have done yesterday. It must be, and as effectually as circumstances will admit, done to-day.

The bridge at the rear gate does not seem to be understood. The planks must be always kept ready to lay down. The breach of the captured fort ought to be strengthened. (The officer must be told, on the appearance of any people near it, to warn them off, and immediately let a party fall in near it); this latter does not apply to Lieut. Sturt.