There was also a kind of imperfect or informal acquittal, which consisted in admitting the accused to bail at the end of the trial. It saved the tribunal from the trouble of a decision and of an acknowledgement that the prosecution had been in error, but it was cruel to the party involved, as it left him but partly liberated and with the stigma of heresy. Its working is fairly exemplified by the case of Petronila de Lucena, tried in 1534, at Toledo on a charge of Lutheranism. After nearly a year's incarceration, her brother, also under trial, revoked in the torture the evidence which he had given against her. There was no other testimony, yet she was not acquitted but merely released, March 20, 1535, under bail of a hundred thousand maravedis, to present herself when summoned. The security was furnished and she was delivered to the bondsmen as her gaolers. On June 27th, she petitioned for release, for the discharge of the bondsmen and for the removal of the sequestration, which included some articles of personal necessity in the hands of the gaoler; she was, she pleaded, poor and an orphan, she needed the property and wished to be free to dispose of herself. No notice was taken of this and, sixteen months later, on October 20, 1536, she applied again; this time an order to lift the sequestration was issued, but there is no record of her having been released from subjection to bail. She thus remained under the ban and, at the age of 25, the two careers open to a Spanish woman--marriage and the nunnery--were virtually closed to her.[298]
There was yet another kind of acquittal, still more informal, in which the accused was simply discharged and bade to be gone, without a sentence, leaving him under the dreadful uncertainty of what might be his position. An instance of this is the case of Miguel Mezquita, tried for Lutheranism at Valencia, in 1536. The evidence was of the flimsiest, and the inquisitors merely ordered him to be released from prison without making further provision.[299]
The comparative frequency of these various forms of release, in the earlier period, may be inferred from the record of the Toledo tribunal from 1484 to 1531, in which there are eighty-six cases of acquittal, to only four of suspension, four of release under bail, and two of simple discharge--the latter forms thus being negligible quantities.[300] The proportions changed rapidly with time, showing how much more in harmony with the spirit of the institution were the forms which evaded acknowledgement of error. A record of the same tribunal, from 1575 to 1610, contains an aggregate of eleven hundred and seventy-two cases of all kinds, in which there were fifty-one acquittals, ninety-eight suspensions and thirty simple discharges.[301] This tendency continued with increasing development. A Toledo record from 1648 to 1694, comprises twelve hundred and five cases, of which but six ended in acquittal, one in discharge for mistaken identity, and a hundred and four in suspension, nearly all of the latter coupled with a reprimand in the audience-chamber--apparently a scolding for having given the tribunal so much bootless trouble. The suspensions were, in nearly every case, ordered by the Suprema, as though the inquisitors shrank from the admission which it involved.[302]