I come to the second subsidiary assertion. "A general repeal and arming of merchant vessels, would be war with both, and war of the worst kind, suffering the enemies to plunder us, without retaliation upon them."
I have before exposed the absurdity of a war with two belligerents, each hostile to the other. It cannot be true, therefore, that "a general repeal and arming our merchant vessels," would be such a war. Neither if war resulted, would it be "war of the worst kind." In my humble apprehension, a war, in which our enemies are permitted to plunder us, and our merchants not permitted to defend their property, is somewhat worse than a war like this; in which, with arms in their hands, our brave seamen might sometimes prove too strong for their piratical assailants. By the whole amount of property which we might be able to preserve by these means, would such a war be better than that in which we are now engaged. For the committee assure us, that the aggressions to which we are subject, "are to all intents and purposes a maritime war, waged with both nations against the United States."
The last assertion of the committee, in this most masterly page is, that "a partial repeal must from the situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors, and war with the other." In the name of common sense, how can this be true? The trade to Sweden, to Spain, to China, is not now affected by the orders or decrees of either belligerent. How is it submission, then, to these orders for us to trade to Gottenburg, when neither France nor Britain command, nor prohibit it? Of what consequence is it to us what way the Gottenburg merchant disposes of our products, after he has paid us our price? I am not about to deny that a trade to Gottenburg would defeat the purpose of coercing Great Britain, through the want of our supplies, but I reason on the report upon its avowed principles. If gentlemen adhere to their system, as a means of coercion, let the Administration avow it as such, and support the system, by arguments, such as their friends use every day on this floor. Let them avow, as those friends do, that this is our mode of hostility against Great Britain. That it is better than "ball and gunpowder." Let them show that the means are adequate to the end; let them exhibit to us, beyond the term of all this suffering, a happy salvation, and a glorious victory, and the people may then submit to it, even without murmur. But while the Administration support their system only as a municipal regulation, as a means of safety and preservation, those who canvass their principle are not called upon to contest with them on ground, which not only they do not take, but which, officially, they disavow. As partial repeal would not be submission to either, so, also, it would not be war with either. A trade to Sweden would not be war with Great Britain; that nation is her ally, and she permits it. Nor with France, though Sweden is her enemy, she does not prohibit it. Ah! but say the committee, "a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents, would be war with the other." This is the State secret; this is the master-key to the whole policy. You must not only do what the letter of these orders prohibits, but you must not sin against the spirit of them. The great purpose is, to prevent your product from getting to our enemy, and to effect this you must not only so act as to obey the terms of the decrees, but keeping the great purpose of them always in sight, you must extend their construction to cases which they cannot, by any rule of reason, be made to include.