Italy, through Senator Schanzer, greeted the proposal as “The first effective step toward giving the world a release of such nature as to enable it to start the work of its economic reconstruction.”

France—her Premier, Briand, spoke for her—slid over the naval program. France, he said, had already entered on the right way—the way Mr. Hughes had indicated; her real interest was elsewhere. “I rather turn,” said M. Briand, “to another side of the problem to which Mr. Balfour has alluded, and I thank him for this. Is it only a question here of economy? Is it only a question of estimates and budgets? If it were so, if that were the only purpose you have in view, it will be really unworthy of the great nation that has called us here.

Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise — Part 21

“So the main question, the crucial question, which is to be discussed here, is to know if the peoples of the world will be at last able to come to an understanding in order to avoid the atrocities of war. And then, gentlemen, when it comes on the agenda, as it will inevitably come, to the question of land armament, a question particularly delicate for France, as you are all aware, we have no intention to eschew this. We shall answer your appeal, fully conscious that this is a question of grave and serious nature for us.”

Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise — Part 21

What more was there to do? England, Japan and the United States had accepted “in principle” a program for the limitation of navies, much more drastic than the majority of people had dreamed possible. To be sure the details were still to be worked out, but that seemed easy. Had not the Conference finished its work? There were people that said so. No. Mr. Hughes had simply awakened the country to what was possible if the reasons for armament could be removed.

Peacemakers--Blessed and Otherwise — Part 21

So far as we, the United States, were concerned, these reasons were fourfold:

(1) Our Pacific possessions. Until we felt reasonably sure that they were safe from possible attack by Japan, we must keep our navy and strengthen our fortifications.

(2) The England-Japan pact. We suspected it. It might be a threat. So long as it existed could we wisely limit our navy?

(3) Our Open Door policy in China. We meant to stand by that. It had been invaded by Japan in the Great War; could we reaffirm it now and secure assurances we trusted that there would be no further encroachments? If not, could we limit our armament?