NOTE.--It is to be observed that in the discussions of this chapter the question at issue between Intuitional and Utilitarian Ethics is not yet reached. For, granting that we can elicit by reflection clear rules of duty under the heads of Wisdom, Caution and Decision, the rules are obviously not independent; they presuppose an intellectual judgment otherwise obtained, or capable of being obtained, as to what is right or expedient to do.
[183] Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom, restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word (φρόνησις) to denote the latter.
[184] I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect. Cf. _ante_, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p. 59, note.
[185] It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain; and some are dangerous--that is, involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be avoided--while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution may obviously be determined without difficulty.
[186] See p. 223, and § 2 of the next chapter.
§ 1. We have seen that the virtue of Practical Wisdom comprehends all others, so far as virtuous conduct in each department necessarily results from a clear knowledge and choice of the true ultimate end or ends of action, and of the best means to the attainment of such end or ends.[187] From this point of view, we may consider the names of the special virtues as denoting special departments of this knowledge; which it is now our business to examine more closely.
When, however, we contemplate these, we discern that there are other virtues, which, in different ways, may be regarded as no less comprehensive than Wisdom. Especially in modern times, since the revival of independent ethical speculation, there have always been thinkers who have maintained, in some form, the view that Benevolence is a supreme and architectonic virtue, comprehending and summing up all the others, and fitted to regulate them and determine their proper limits and mutual relations.[188] This widely supported claim to supremacy seems an adequate reason for giving to Benevolence the first place after Wisdom, in our examination of the commonly received maxims of Duty and Virtue.