=By this measure nowe of |Fidelitie, trust| or |loyall credit| of a seruant, in which place our |Secretorie|, as you see standeth bounden by the first degrée of his seruice, it maie secondlie be coniectured, in what respectiue estate, he ought for the residue of that which to his attendance appertaineth, bee accounted a |Friend|. The limits of |Friendship| (as it might bee obiected) are streight, and there can bee no Friend where an inequalitie remaineth. Twixt the partie commaunded and him that commaundeth, there is no societie, and therefore no |Friendship| where resteth a |Superioritie|. But I say and affirme, that if it bee true, that the summe of all |Friendship| taketh his originall of loue, and that the true demonstration of loue groweth by a |simpathie| of affections, of which affections |Vertue| is said to be the whole & simple ground, then may this |simpathie| of affectiōs so groūded on |vertue| as aforesaid, be turned into loue, notwithstanding yᵉ inequality of estate or condition whereby a man vertuouslie disposed, being seruant to such a one who is honourablie inclined, may in that place of seruice in which he continueth, be reputed in processe of time to become as a friend.=
=But if we shall goe to the true definition of friendship, you will then saie, that this friendshippe so called and reputed among men, as it is a |simpathie| of affections firmlie vnited togithers, so is it such a vniting, as wherein what the one coueteth, the other desireth, in respect whereof worlds and life, and all are not desirable, but despised, I would not here be taken, that of any sorts of people that run into all or a number of these like effects, without exception of qualitie, I intend, that they therfore were also to beare the name of |friends|, for so men vtterly vicious and lewdly giuen, consorting in wickednes, and other base exercises, in which each spendeth his life, or desperatlie dieth one for another, might be reputed as |friends|, I haue no such meaning, nor is my intent herein to so generall a purpose. But speaking of |friendship|, I only deale with such, whose actions and sincere desires haue in |vertue| highest preheminence, for these, not by aduenture, but by a deliberate counsell and choise regard speciallie had, of things valuable and worthy, do accomplish their effects by a most honourable purpose.=