But suppose we are permitted to employ the term "nature" to denote the essential properties of matter, and the various forms of energy,[247] potential and kinetic; and suppose we admit that matter is indestructible, and that the amount of energy in the world is unchanged, the sum of the actual and potential energies being a constant quantity; still we are not entitled from these premises to infer the absolute uniformity in the succession of events--that is, the uniformity of the phenomenal. We have already seen that no phenomenon known to man is the result of a single property of matter or a single form of energy. "All issues in nature are the effects produced upon matter by the resultant of component forces." The phenomena of nature are the result of adjustments, combinations, and distributions of matter and of force in endless variety and complexity. Hence we have in nature the variable, the contingent, the particular, as well as the invariable, the uniform, and the general. This is admitted by Comte: "That which engenders this _irregular variability_ of the effect is the great number of different agents determining at the same time the same phenomena; and from which it results, in the most complicated phenomena, _that there are no two cases precisely alike_. We have no occasion, in order to find such complexity, to go to the phenomena of living beings. It presents itself in bodies without life, for example, in studying meteorological phenomena.... _Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had not been subject to any precise condition._"[248]

Thus we are led by various lines of thought to the same conclusion. It is certain that we can only learn what the uniformities (the laws) of nature are by _experience_, and in order to determine whether all the successions of events have been and now are universally uniform, we must have a _universal_ experience. If there have been deviations from general laws under peculiar conditions--if one form of energy has been counteracted and modified by another form of energy, or even by an intelligent Will, so as to give a _particular_ result--experience (= observation and testimony) must be just as adequate to attest the reality of that particular deviation as it is to attest the prevalence of general laws.[249] We have no intuitive and necessary conviction of the uniformity of nature, and therefore we can not affirm in an _à priori_ manner what is _possible_ or _impossible_. Those scientists who adopt the maxim of Faraday, that in the investigation of new and peculiar phenomena "we must set out with clear ideas of the possible and the impossible," are doomed to move in a vicious circle. They can not be sure that a fact of experience is a real fact until they have ascertained the laws of nature in the case, and they can not ascertain what the laws of nature are until they have ascertained the facts. They must not profess to have learned any thing until they have ascertained that it is possible, and they can not decide that it is possible until they have learned every thing, because the single item of knowledge they are deficient in may be the very principle which warrants a belief in the possibility of the fact. The maxim is obviously absurd. In its theological bearings it is repudiated even by Professor Tyndall, the pupil and successor of Faraday at the Royal Institution. "You never hear the really philosophical defenders of the doctrine of uniformity speaking of _impossibilities_ in nature. They never say ... that it is impossible for the Builder of the universe to alter his work. Their business is not with the possible, but with the actual."[250]

The Theistic Conception of the World — Part 109