This was an action to recover damages in the sum of $10,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while entering one of the defendant's passenger trains in Kentucky for an intrastate trip. The plaintiff was a citizen and resident of Texas and the defendant a corporate citizen and resident of Virginia. The action was begun in a state court in Bracken county, Ky., and, because of the diverse citizenship of the parties, was removed, at the defendant's instance, into the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky, which includes Bracken county. When the transcript reached the District Court, the plaintiff moved that the cause be remanded to the state court on the ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction in that neither party was a resident of that district. The motion was overruled, the plaintiff elected to stand on the motion, and judgment was given for the defendant. The plaintiff then brought the case here on a direct writ of error (Judicial Code, § 238 [Comp. St. § 1215]), to obtain a review of the ruling on his motion to remand.

Under the Constitution, art. 3, § 2, the judicial power extends, among other cases, to such as arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to such as are between citizens of different states.

Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

Section 24 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 991) defines the general jurisdiction of the District Courts, the pertinent provision being as follows:

Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

'The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction * * * of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, * * * where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is between citizens of different states. * * *'

Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company/Opinion of the Court

This grant of jurisdiction covers two distinct classes of suits. In one the citizenship of the parties is not an element, while in the other it is the distinctive feature. As to the suit before us it is very clear that the diverse citizenship of the parties and the sum inv lved bring it within the latter class, and therefore within the general jurisdiction of the District Courts.

Section 51 of the Code (Comp. St. § 1033) relates to the venue of suits originally begun in those courts, and provides, subject to exceptions not material here, that--

'* * * No civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.'

It is a necessary conclusion from repeated decisions, going back to the original Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73) that this provision does not limit the general jurisdiction of the District Courts or withdraw any suit therefrom, but merely confers a personal privilege on the defendant, which he may assert, or may waive, at his election, and does waive if, when sued in some other district, he enters an appearance without claiming his privilege. Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699, 5 L. Ed. 719; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330, 9 L. Ed. 1093; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 378, 24 L. Ed. 853; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U.S. 129, 14 Sup. Ct. 286, 38 L. Ed. 98; Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, 160 U.S. 217, 16 Sup. Ct. 272, 40 L. Ed. 401; United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1, 12, 35 Sup. Ct. 459, 59 L. Ed. 813, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 286; Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 311, 39 Sup. Ct. 478, 63 L. Ed. 997; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. (November 27, 1922) 260 U.S. 261, 43 Sup. Ct. 106, 67 L. Ed. --. The following excerpt from Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, at page 219 of 160 U.S., at page 273 of 16 Sup. Ct. (40 L. Ed. 401), is particularly apposite: