It is said of Christ that he was infinitely kind and generous, infinitely merciful because when on earth he cured the sick, the lame, and the blind. Has he not as much power now as he had then? If he has and is the God of all worlds, why does he not now give back to the widow her son? Why does he withhold light from the blind, and why does one who had the power miraculously to feed thousands allow millions to die for want of food? Where is he now? ("Ingersoll's Interviews.")
Assuming then, the existence of a First Cause, let us inquire for a moment into its nature. The First Cause must be infinite. For if we regard it as finite, we regard it as bounded or limited, and are thus compelled to think of a region beyond its limits, which region is uncaused. And if we admit this, we virtually abandon the doctrine of causation altogether. We, therefore, have no alternative but to regard the First Cause an infinite.
We are no less irresistibly compelled to regard the First Cause as independent. For if it be dependent, that on which it depends must be the First Cause. The First Cause can therefore have no necessary relation to any other form of being; since if the presence of any other form of existence is necessary to its completeness, it is partially dependent upon such other form of existence, and cannot be the First Cause. Thus the First Cause, besides being infinite, must be complete in itself, existing independently of all relations,--that is, it must be absolute.
To such conclusions, following the most refined metaphysical philosophy of the day, are we easily led. By the very limitations of our faculties, we are compelled to think of a First Cause of all phenomena; and we are compelled to think of it as both infinite and absolute.
Nevertheless, it will not be difficult to show that such a conclusion is utterly illusive; and that in joining together, the three conceptions of Cause, of Infinite, and of Absolute, we have woven for ourselves a net-work of contradictions, more formidable, more disheartening than any that we have yet been required to contemplate. For, in the first place, that which is a cause cannot at the same time be absolute. For the definition of the Absolute is that which exists out of all relations; whereas a cause not only sustains some definite relation to its effect, but it exists as a cause only by virtue of such relation. Suppress the effect, and the cause has ceased to be a cause. The phrase "absolute cause," therefore, which is equivalent to "non-relative cause," is like the phrase "circular triangle." The two words stand for conceptions which cannot be made to unite. "We attempt," says Mr. Mansel, "to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here, we are checkmated by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits.