_ROK 1st Division_ holding the left anchor in the Munsan-ni area and controlling the 5th KMC Battalion on the Kimpo Peninsula;

_British 1st Commonwealth Division_ across the river Imjin to the northeast;

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 170

_U.S. 1st Cavalry Division_ (Greek and Thai Battalions attached) still farther to the northeast in the Yonchon area;

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 170

_U.S. 3rd Infantry Division_ (Belgian Battalion and Philippine 20th BCT attached) having the responsibility for the vital Chorwon area;

U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) — Part 170

_U.S. 25th Infantry Division_ (Turkish Brigade attached) defending the area west of Kumhwa;

_ROK 2d Division_ holding a sector east of Kumhwa;

_U.S. 7th Infantry Division_ (Ethiopian Battalion attached) on the right;

_ROK 6th Division_ with a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan River, the Corps boundary;

_U.S. 24th Infantry Division_ (Colombian Battalion attached) in Corps reserve south of Hwachon;

_U.S. 2d Infantry Division_ (French and Netherlands Battalions attached) in left-central portion of Corps front;

_ROK 5th Division_ occupying a narrow sector to the east;

_U.S. 1st Marine Division_ holding eastern portion of the Corps sector;

_ROK 11th Division_ responsible for left of the Corps front;

_ROK Capitol Division_ holding the line eastward to the Sea of Japan;

_ROK 3d Division_ in reserve at Yangyang for a period of training.[296]

[296] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Oct 31, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3.

Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended its line eastward to relieve the 8th ROK Division on the extreme right of the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Division on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 2d Infantry Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines.

“Theirs not to reason why” could never have been written about American fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have always taken a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical decisions governing their operations. This applies with particular force to the Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of operations above the division level.