Chapter 26.—Of the Image of the

Supreme Trinity, Which We Find in Some Sort in Human Nature Even in

Its Present State.

And we indeed recognize in

ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an

image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be

very far removed from Him,—being neither co-eternal, nor, to say

all in a word, consubstantial with Him,—is yet nearer to Him in

nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet

restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance.  For we

both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our

knowledge of it.  Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming

illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by

some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of

us,—colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by

smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by

touching,—of all which sensible objects it is the images

resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind

and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the

objects.  But, without any delusive representation of images or

phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight

in this.  In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of

the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are

deceived?  For if I am deceived, I am.  For he who is not, cannot be

deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am.  And

since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I

am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XI/Chapter 26

Footnotes

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I/Volume II/City of God/Book XI/Chapter 26