Chapter 26.—Of the Image of the
Supreme Trinity, Which We Find in Some Sort in Human Nature Even in
Its Present State.
And we indeed recognize in
ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an
image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be
very far removed from Him,—being neither co-eternal, nor, to say
all in a word, consubstantial with Him,—is yet nearer to Him in
nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet
restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance. For we
both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our
knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming
illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by
some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of
us,—colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by
smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by
touching,—of all which sensible objects it is the images
resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind
and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the
objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or
phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight
in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of
the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are
deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be
deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And
since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I
am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?