Having stated premises in which all are agreed, I now state my first proposition:
In sustaining this proposition I shall introduce no witnesses but those whose perfect reliability is vouched for by the Atheist himself; so we shall have no dispute concerning the credibility and perfect reliability of witnesses. For the Atheist, claiming to be a votary of reason, as well as a boasted free and fearless thinker, certainly can not impeach the testimony of his own mind. And, being a free and fearless thinker, he will not try to conceal or prevent the witness, when on the stand, from telling the whole truth. I am now ready for the evidence.
The scene changes; Christian is alone in his studio, and a rap is heard at the door. It is opened, and Mr. Atheist is invited to enter, and being seated, Christian addresses him thus:
Mr. Atheist, I am glad you have called, and if you have the leisure time and are perfectly free to do so, I would like to talk with you on the evidence of the existence of God.
_Atheist_--I am not only willing, but as anxious as you can be to examine this question.
_Christian_--Very well. I suppose you have examined the evidence in the premises, and from all the testimony, carefully analyzed, made your decision.
_Atheist_--You do me justice in thus supposing, for I claim to be a reasonable being, and to follow fearlessly the lamp of reason; and, doing this on scientific and philosophic principles, I have become satisfied that there is no God.
_Christian_--Will you allow me to state my analysis of the mind and ask you if it is correct?
_Atheist_--You, Mr. C., are approaching from a singular yet a pleasing stand-point; will you please give me your analysis? If it is good, I will say so; if defective, I will point out its errors.
_Christian_--It is this: The mind of man may be divided into ten parts or powers; five external, or the five senses; and five internal. The external I need not name. The internal may be presented thus: First, perception; second, reflection; third, memory; fourth, reason; fifth, judgment, or decision; each of these entirely dependent upon its immediate predecessor for support and action. We can not judge of that upon which we have not reasoned, nor reason where we have not remembered, nor remember that of which we have not first thought; neither can we think of that which we have not perceived, nor perceive without the action of some one of the five senses.