The threat that failure would imply condemnation was by no means an idle one. About this time, Fray Juan de Madrid was tried before the tribunal of Toledo; there was much adverse evidence in full detail, and the only defence lay in disabling the witnesses. This was partially successful, but enough remained to justify the inquisitors in saying in the sentence that he could have been condemned on it but that, in benignity and mercy, he was offered compurgation. He willingly accepted it and named his compurgators, but half of them refused to sustain his oath of denial, declaring that through their knowledge of him they held him as suspect. This was conclusive; he was considered to be convicted of the charges and the consulta de fe had no hesitation in voting him to relaxation. In like manner, on February 3, 1503, Jayme Benet was burnt at Barcelona because he failed in the compurgation enjoined on him.[308]
A change, probably attributable to the growing desire for absolute secrecy, prescribed by the Instructions of 1500, altered profoundly the prevailing theory of compurgation, for it prohibited the reading to the compurgators of the evidence and defence. In their presence the accused was to deny under oath the charges which were recapitulated by the inquisitors, and the compurgators were simply to be asked whether they believed that he swore the truth, and no other questions.[309] There seems to have been some trouble in abrogating the custom of reading the evidence, for the prohibition had to be repeated in 1514.[310]
In the project presented to Charles V, in 1520, by the Conversos, with the object of rendering the inquisitorial process less effective, there was included a modification of compurgation in such wise as to facilitate escape.[311] Of course no attention was paid to this, but that some alteration of the process was required by justice is manifest from one or two minor reforms soon afterwards. In 1523 it was ordered that the fiscal should not be present after the compurgators were sworn, which is suggestive of his influencing them adversely. Still more essential was a regulation of 1529, forbidding those who had testified against the accused from serving as his compurgators.[312] Apparently it was one of the results of suppressing the names of witnesses that the poor wretch, in his ignorance, would sometimes call upon those to save him who had been procuring his destruction, and the inquisitors had not sufficient sense of justice to exclude them, although they had power to refuse admission to any one supposed to be friendly to him. There was also a favorable modification of the ancient practice requiring unanimity on the part of the conjurators, for Simancas tells us that the inquisitors, when specifying the number to act, could also designate how many defections would be allowed without prejudicing the result.[313]