♦MOTION OF THANKS TO THE ARMIES. SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.♦

When a motion for thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle of Salamanca was brought forward, Sir Francis Burdett said, he was far from wishing; invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompense that it was in the power of Parliament to bestow: but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as having been equal in importance to the battle of Blenheim, and to other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted, ... delusions which were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more deeply in a destructive and ruinous war: for after their boasted and over-praised victories, we were still as far from our object as ever. What! were we to suffer the French troops to recover from the effect of their discomfiture and exhaustion, and to wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source? Were we to be satisfied with a retreat? Yet, where now was the Marquis of Wellington? In what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our advantages but calamity and distress; and it followed, therefore, that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers. Lord Castlereagh, Sir Francis pursued, in the plenitude of his satisfaction, had not confined himself to Spain, but had travelled out of his course, and taken the House to Russia, where in the destruction of from 200,000 to 300,000 human beings, in the burning of Moscow, and in the devastation of an immense tract of Russian territory, he found new causes of congratulation, new sources of national pride and gratitude! Would he be equally inclined to consider it a matter of triumph, if Buonaparte (which in his opinion was more than probable) should extricate himself from his perils, and after having found good winter-quarters, return to the contest with renovated ardour in the spring? Could he believe it possible that Russia could continue such a contest, and undergo a repetition of similar dreadful experiments and sacrifices? Supposing he marched to Petersburgh, which seemed to be his ultimate intention, would the same mode of defence as at Moscow be adopted? Would Russia burn Petersburgh too? He for one could not greatly admire the magnanimity of burning that, the preservation of which ought to have been fought for; nor could he see the shining character of the Emperor Alexander, who was not, like the Emperor of the French, personally sharing in the dangers of the war. He could not subdue the conviction which arose in his mind on viewing all these things, of the utter impossibility of the Emperor of Russia’s feeling any exultation whatever: on the contrary, he thought that unfortunate individual must be oppressed by a view of the irreparable calamities to which himself and his people had been, and were ♦DEC. 7.♦ likely still further to be, exposed. Farther than this, when a grant was moved to the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, he did not wish to divide the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington’s victories had none of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them again; and that in the capture of the fortresses which he had won, a waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the campaign, ... the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever.

History of the Peninsular War Volume VI (of 6) — Part 70