The fuller we examine into the _jehad_, the more clear it becomes that the late combination more nearly approached a general movement among all sections than any that has yet been attempted. In the short period during which it existed, nearly every available fighting man in North-Eastern Afghanistan flocked to the banners consecrated by Mushk-i-Alam; and if the success of the _jehad_ had been a little longer-lived—say by the interception of our reinforcements—there would have been streams of men setting in for Cabul from Turkistan, Badakshan, and the Shutargardan district, which would have made Mahomed Jan the leader of that “lakh of men” of which he boasted. Every chief of importance among the wide-spread Ghilzais and the more compact Kohistanis and Safis was up in arms, and the fighting at Jugdulluck showed that Asmatullah Khan and his Lughmanis were at one with their friends besieging Sherpur. Even Padshah Khan, whose virtues short-sighted politicians have extolled, brought a contingent to Cabul, and fought against us with desperate hatred, although he had greatly smoothed our path during the first march from Ali Khel. With Mahomed Jan were also Mir Butcha and several other Kohistani chiefs—Usman Khan, the Safi leader of Tagao; Gholam Hyder Khan (Logari), and Aslam Khan, Colonel of Artillery, both of whom fought at Charasia; and several minor Ghilzai leaders, who had each brought their following of 500 or 1,000 men. The countenance Mahomed Jan and Mushk-i-Alam received from Yakub Khan’s mother and wife gave them a status which they did not fail to use to the best of their advantage; and while, perhaps, half their followers were freebooters, intent upon looting Hindus and Kizilbashes, they made it appear in their attempt to negotiate with Sir Frederick Roberts that they were the patriotic leaders of a movement which had for its object not so much the ejectment of the British army, as the revival of the Amirship. Singularly enough, the removal of Yakub Khan was made a pretext for their occupation of Cabul, and this in the face of their callousness as to his fate when he was a prisoner in our camp. Yakub’s mother, working through Mushk-i-Alam and his _moollahs_, turned the full tide of religious enthusiasm aroused by the _jehad_ into channels which should serve to place either her exiled son or her grandson on the throne, and the proclamation of Musa Jan as Amir was a bold step, which may yet give us much trouble to nullify. Musa Jan is in the hands of Mushk-i-Alam, who may renew his _jehad_. By setting up the child in state at Ghazni, and formulating decrees and proclamations in his name, he may give the people a pretext for denying the existence of British authority further than the few acres commanded by our guns about Cabul: and taking religion again as a rallying cry, he may by Nauroz be ready with another 30,000 men to try conclusions with us again. The late army which besieged us does not exist, save in scattered units. The feeling which drew it together is still alive; for fanaticism only slumbers in this country, and has sometimes so rapid an awakening that it must be constantly watched. The ten days’ success of Mahomed Jan will be quoted as proving that, under more favourable conditions, it might be extended indefinitely; and unless, by our preparations, we show that the conditions in future, instead of being more favourable, become steadily less and less attractive to men who may be called upon to join a new _jehad_, the British army of occupation may be again isolated. It is to be hoped that no false measure of economy will prevent the strength of the force here being so raised that from 3,000 to 4,000 men will _always_ be available for outside work, after Sherpur or whatever lines we may occupy have been strongly garrisoned. Our reinforcements number only 1,400 men, and Luttabund is still left without a garrison; while 100 of the 9th Foot and the whole of the 12th Bengal Cavalry have been sent to Butkhak to hold that post. We may seem strong enough now when we have not an enemy within twenty miles; but so we seemed equally safe three weeks ago, when we disbelieved in the possibility of 30,000 Afghans ever collecting together.