In order that, in the sphere of ideas, we may not leave the corresponding experiences unmentioned: here in the same way every idea is found to be something good in itself, and that with every enlargement in the realm of our ideas, quite apart from what of good or bad may result therefrom, the good within us is increased.[33]
Here then, and from such experiences of love qualified as right, arises within us the knowledge that anything is truly and unmistakably good in the full extent to which we are capable of such knowledge.[34]
This last clause is added advisedly; for we must not, of course, conceal from ourselves the fact that we have no guarantee that everything which is good will arouse within us a love with the character of rightness. Wherever this is not the case our criterion fails, and the good then, so far as our knowledge and practical account of it are concerned, is as much as non-existent.[35]
28. It is, however, not _one_ but many things which we thus recognize as good. And so the questions remain: In that which is good, and especially in what, as good, is attainable, which is the better? and further, which is the highest practical good? so that it may become the standard for our actions.
29. We must first inquire: When is anything better than anything else and recognized by us as better? and what is meant by “the better” at all?
The answer now lies ready to hand though not in such a way as to render it unnecessary to exclude a very possible error. If by “good” is meant that which is worthy of being loved for its own sake, then by “better” appears to be meant that which is worthy of being loved with a greater love. But is this really so? What is meant by “with greater love”? Is it spatial magnitude? Hardly; no one would propose to measure pleasure or displeasure in feet and inches. “The intensity of the pleasure,” some will perhaps say, “is what is meant in speaking of love as great.” According to this “better” would mean that which pleases with a more intense pleasure. But such a definition closely examined would involve the greatest absurdities. According to this view, each single case in which joy is felt in anything would seem only to admit of a certain measure of joy, whereas one would naturally think that it could not possibly be reprehensible to rejoice in what is really good to the fullest extent possible. Or, as we say, “with all one’s heart.” Descartes has already observed that the act of loving (when directed towards what is good at all) can never be too intense.[36] And he is manifestly right. Were it otherwise what cautiousness should we not be called upon to exercise considering the limits of our mental strength! Every time one wished to rejoice over something good, an anxious survey would be necessary respecting other existing goods in order that the measure of proportion to our total strength might in no way be exceeded. And if one believes in a God, understanding thereby the Infinite Good, the Ideal of all ideals, then, since a man, even with his whole soul and strength can only love God with an act of love of finite intensity he will therefore be compelled to love every other good with an infinitely small degree of intensity, and, since this is impossible, must cease as a matter of fact to love it at all.