[Footnote 207: Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether she would respect Belgium's neutrality.--Author.]

"Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could--if he was really concerned about Belgium--have spared that unhappy land its terrible fate. But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality had been taken from our opponent's hand in advance. Yet Grey actually considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British Cabinet. Yes, he dared even more.

What Germany Thinks — Part 163

"After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the _Labour Leader_, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August 27th, as to whether Lichnowsky's proposal had been submitted to the Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful negotiations with Germany. Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate between official proposals made by a government, and a private question asked by an ambassador.

What Germany Thinks — Part 163

"When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was cried down. The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from this Parliamentary incident: 'That all Sir Edward Grey's answers to Mr. Keir Hardie's questions are examples of _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio falsi_.' His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value as objective evidence.

What Germany Thinks — Part 163

"After Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate England's conditions for her neutrality. At the same time the Ambassador increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies in return for England's neutrality. Grey suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans. Only an immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.

"Even before he could assume that Belgian neutrality was in danger, he pledged English policy to the wishes of France. On the afternoon of the same August 1st, he gave the French Ambassador--who was anxiously pressing for a decision--reason to believe that he would be able to give a formal promise on the following day. At the Cabinet meeting on August 2nd--the same in which he suppressed Germany's offer!--he got a motion accepted empowering him to assure Cambon that if Germany attacked the French coast, England would intervene."