We must now turn to Kant’s account of space and time which is given in the _Æsthetic_, the first part of the _Critique_. He begins by showing the impossibility of the two views of the nature of space and time which then held the field, the views of Newton and Leibniz. Newton had thought of space and time as realities, things in themselves existing along with other things. But obviously we cannot think of space as a separate thing existing by itself; for space without things would have no determination or possibility of determination, and would be to us just nothing, whereas, as it is, it is something to us. The same holds of time. The Newtonian doctrine, Kant says, "forces us to assume two eternal, infinite, and self-subsisting non-realities, which are there, without any reality in them, only that they may comprehend all reality." Just because things are in space and time, space and time are not themselves things. But if this makes us say that space and time are only relations between or qualities of things, we find ourselves in difficulties as obvious. We do not come to apprehend space and time by comparing things and seeing that they have a common quality of being "spatial" or "temporal," as we come to apprehend redness, _e.g._, by seeing red things. The perception of space and time is implied in each and every perception of things. We cannot, therefore, derive them from our study of things; we must begin with them. Further, Kant notices, as against Leibniz, that space and time are not ordinary concepts because they have no instances. Different men are instances of man, but different spaces or times are only parts or determinations of the one space and the one time. As against the view, then, that would make space and time only relations, derived from our comparison of things which are not temporal or spatial, Kant insists that space and time are a priori. We cannot see things without seeing them outside one another--_i.e._ in space--or experience succession or change without experiencing it in time. Space and time, then, have a certain independence of things in space and time. The qualitative differences of things in space or events in time do not affect the nature of space and time, and we can and do study and discuss spatial and temporal relations quite independently of such differences.