One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies neither in this purely defensive attitude, nor in the offensive enterprises previously alluded to, by which the concentration of the enemy would be disturbed or other material successes might be achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins when important and possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry--_i.e._, when the main bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.
Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be reached _in the far more important duty_, in the now indispensable task, of securing the _widest possible sphere of intelligence_.
Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves together into clearly-defined masses.
There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus ascertained, becomes of essential importance.
Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the fact of this concentration provides the Cavalry with the opportunities necessary to solve the problem before it.
Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply, and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical concentration begins.